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-	SUPERIOR COURT OF TH	E STATE OF CALIFORNIA					
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11	FOR THE COUNTY	OF LOS ANGELES					
12	FIBER FIRST LOS ANGELES; MOTHERS) CASE NO.: 23STCP00750					
13	OF EAST LA; UNION BINACIONAL DE						
	ORGANIZACIONES DE TRABAJADORES MEXICANOS EXBRACEROS 1942-1964;	FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND					
14	BOYLE HEIGHTS COMMUNITY	COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND					
15	PARTNERS; UNITED KEETOOWAH BAND	INJUNCTIVE RELIEF					
16	OF CHEROKEE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA; CALIFORNIA FIRES & FIREFIGHTERS;) California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub					
	MALIBU FOR SAFE TECH; EMF SAFETY) Res. Code § 21000 <i>et seq.</i> ; Planning & Zoning					
17	NETWORK; CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFE	Law, Cal. Government Code § 65000 et seq.;					
18	TECHNOLOGY; 5G FREE CALIFORNIA;	County Code §§ 22.02.050, 22.232.040,					
19	and CHILDREN'S HEALTH DEFENSE,	22.244.030, and 22.244.040; Cal. Const. art. I, § 7; Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1085, 1094.5					
20	Plaintiffs and Petitioners,						
	v.	Petition filed: March 7, 2023					
21	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; COUNTY OF) Trial:					
22	LOS ANGELES BOARD OF SUPERVISORS;	Date: March 12, 2023					
23	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES REGIONAL	Time: 1:30 p.m.					
	PLANNING COMMISSION; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF) Assigned for all purposes to the Honorphie					
24	REGIONAL PLANNING; COUNTY OF LOS	Assigned for all purposes to the Honorable James C. Chalfant, Department 85					
25	ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC						
26	WORKS; and DOES 1–10, inclusive;						
27	Defendants, Respondents, and Real)					
	Parties in Interest	,)					
28							

	202) 854-1310 512) 692-2522 th.assistantid/childrenshealthdefense.org nding pro hac vice) Scott McCollough Collough Law Firm PC 00 Gatin Creek Rd. pping Springs, Texas 78620 2) 633-3498 512) 692-2522 xmc@dotlaw.biz nding pro hac vice)
FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE A	FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION

1. This lawsuit seeks to enjoin the Respondents, Defendants, and Real Parties in Interest County of Los Angeles ("County"), County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors ("Board of Supervisors"), County of Los Angeles Regional Planning Commission ("Planning Commission"), County of Los Angeles Department of Regional Planning ("Regional Planning"), and County of Los Angeles Department of Public Works ("Public Works" or collectively with County, Board of Supervisors, Planning Commission, and Regional Planning as "Respondents") action on January 10, 2023 (and all previous and subsequent actions) approving an ordinance amending Title 16 and Title 22 of the Los Angeles County Code ("Project" or "Ordinance") to establish regulations for the review and permitting of wireless telecommunication facilities.

2. The Ordinance eliminates discretionary conditional use permitting for most wireless telecommunication facilities, and institutes what is claimed to be ministerial review, stripping away the site-specific environmental inquiries mandated by the California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Public Resources Code ("PRC") § 21000 *et seq* ("CEQA").

3. The Board of Supervisors opted to exempt the Project from CEQA environmental review, ignoring substantial evidence that the Ordinance, through the many individual wireless facilities that will be permitted under the Ordinance's procedures, will have a substantial adverse environmental impact.

4. The Ordinance contains other facial defects, of which the most prominent is an illegal delegation of the Board of Supervisors' legislative authority to the Director of its Planning Department and the Highway Commissioner. Under the Ordinance's permitting procedures for wireless telecommunication facilities, the Director and Commissioner are freely able to create new and substantive obligations, a form of legislative action. They both also have substantial discretion and the ability to exercise subjective judgment even though the process they oversee is claimed to be "ministerial." The Ordinance does not provide any direction or constrain in any way the Director's or Commissioner's discretion and legislative power.

5. The confusion between ministerial and discretionary authority in Titles 16 and 22, the arbitrary assertion of an exemption from CEQA, and the unlawful delegation of legislative authority grant the Los Angeles Planning Department and Department of Public Works with unfettered authority and cut the public out of the wireless facility permitting process. The Board of Supervisors justify this action by claiming the code amendments will close the Digital Divide. This is false. Those most at risk on account of historical and ongoing economic, minority or other forms of discrimination will have no

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voice, will lack effective legal counsel, and will be unable to escape an unsafe, toxic and aesthetically displeasing environment caused by an inferior communications delivery medium. The Ordinance will worsen, not close, the digital divide.

6. Moreover, the Ordinance raises profound constitutional and statutory substantive and procedural due process concerns with regard to individual permit applications that will have a direct and significant impact on those affected by the Project. Those who live near many of the wireless projects that will be governed by the Ordinance will suffer significant losses of personal and real property rights, without any meaningful opportunity to contest or recommend changes to the Ordinance or to the many wireless projects the Ordinance enables, no right to a hearing of any kind, and no appeal to a higher authority within the County, not even to the elected Board of Supervisors. The "ministerial process" the Ordinance designates for most of the permit approvals and thereby forecloses any possibility for the public to review and/or contest any arbitrary actions of non-elected decisionmakers and individuals is not consistent with several state statutes, or the California and U.S. Constitutions.

7. The Ordinance creates the framework for permitting thousands of wireless facilities throughout the incorporated and unincorporated parts of the County. The Board of Supervisors purposefully and unlawfully blinded themselves to the significant and adverse consequences to its local communities and the environment that will occur as a direct or indirect result of this Project. In light of numerous disadvantaged low-income communities in the County, the Ordinance and its proposed ministerial permitting process will have a disparate impact and raise significant environmental justice issues for such communities, without any possibility or procedure for recourse or change.

8. There is ample scientific evidence that a wireless project can often so sicken local residents that it constructively evicts whole families who can no longer tolerate continuous exposure to non-ionizing radiation emitted from small cell and macro cell towers. This situation is especially tragic for poor and minority families who are holding on desperately to affordable housing and lack any financial means of escape. Basic justice demands that these families, who are represented in this case by several petitioners and plaintiffs, be given adequate prior notice and a fair hearing before their voices are silenced, their property is taken or devalued, or their lives are put at risk.

9. As is extensively documented, the wireless facilities will endanger the air, water, flora, fauna, and objects of historic or aesthetic significance. The wireless facilities are not designed to withstand earthquakes or floods and will create new risks of fire.

10. Petitioners seek a Writ of Mandamus, Declaratory, and other relief vacating the County Board of Supervisors' approval of the Ordinance, enjoining all permitting of wireless telecommunication facilities under the Ordinance's procedures, and declaring that County's adoption of the Ordinance failed to comply with CEQA, the California Government Code, the Los Angeles County Code, and the California and U.S. Constitutions.

PARTIES

11. Plaintiff and Petitioner Fiber First Los Angeles is a grassroots community group focused on bringing safe, reliable, and affordable technology to every community in Los Angeles.

12. Plaintiff and Petitioner Mothers of East LA is a California 501(c)(3) non-profit located at 3324 Opal St., Los Angeles, CA 90023, and has been operating since 1986. Mothers of East LA is a community-based group created for the procurement of a better quality of life in East Los Angeles and the protection of our local environment. The organization works to achieve a safe environment for their families, their community and future generations.

13. Plaintiff and Petitioner Union Binacional de Organizaciones de Trabajadores Mexicanos Exbraceros 1942-1964 is a California 501(c)(3) non-profit whose mission is to promote the well-being and the advancement of migrants in the United States. It provides historical, educational, cultural, health, and art programs for the elderly. It also engages in environmental solidarity projects, and provides scholarships for young migrants to achieve maximum personal and professional development in social projects.

14. Plaintiff and Petitioner Boyle Heights Community Partners is a California 501(c)(3) nonprofit located at 603 N. Breed Street, Los Angeles, CA 90033. Boyle Heights Community Partners is centered in the second oldest community in the City of Los Angeles. Its mission is to protect its cultural heritage, history, historic places, and people, as well as the integrity of its community. Boyle Heights Community Partners provides historic preservation education and engages in the landmarking of historic homes, people of significance, and buildings throughout the local community. Boyle Heights Community Partners champions historic preservation and aims to grow a cultural arts presence in its local historic districts, many of which have been designated as a historic preservation overlay zone by the City of Los Angeles Office of Historic Resources.

15. Plaintiff and Petitioner United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma ("UKB") is a sovereign nation, and one of only three federally recognized Cherokee tribes in the United States. UKB is headquartered in Tahlequah, Oklahoma. The UKB are known as the Western Cherokee, or Old Settlers, as many were already moving west to avoid U.S. encroachment before the Trail of Tears officially began. The majority of UKB's more than 14,000 tribal members are located in Oklahoma, but members reside in several other states, including California. Approximately 50 tribal members reside in Los Angeles County.

16. Plaintiff and Petitioner California Fires & Firefighters is a d/b/a for Rocky Mountains for Safe Technology, a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization located at PO Box 1444, Lyons, CO 80540 and incorporated under the laws of Colorado. Its mission is to learn from and safeguard the health of California firefighters whose fire stations were the first targets of cell towers beginning in the 1990s, to advocate for safer working conditions, and to protect the land and the people of California through educating their local elected leaders regarding the increasing threat of telecommunications equipment-initiated fires.

17. Plaintiff and Petitioner Malibu for Safe Tech is a grassroots organization of Los Angeles County residents working to protect its community and environment from the threats of wireless telecommunication. Malibu for Safe Tech works to raise awareness of issues surrounding 5G systems and its impacts to safety, privacy, property values and the health of all living organisms, and interacts with organizations around the nation regarding the same.

18. Plaintiff and Petitioner EMF Safety Network is a grassroots organization that began in Sebastopol, CA and has grown to over 4,500 members from all over the United States, including many in Los Angeles County. The EMF Safety Network is a sponsored project of Ecological Options Network (EON), a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit organization. Since 2009, EMF Safety Network has been driving and building EMF activism to better protect people and nature by keeping thousands of people informed and helping them take action on important EMF issues. EMF Safety Network's mission is to educate and empower people by providing science and solutions to reducing EMFs. Its goal is to improve lives, achieve public policy change, and obtain environmental justice on the local, state and national levels.

19. Plaintiff and Petitioner Californians for Safe Technology is a coalition of grassroots leaders throughout California working with community members on local, state, and national issues regarding safe technology using awareness and education. Its mission is to be a place where organizations and individuals across California can work together to find strategies for educating communities, local governments, and schools on safer technology choices. The coalition aligns itself with organizations that provide the latest scientific research as well as the most current legal and policy decisions regarding safe technology. These groups include Environmental Health Trust, Americans for Responsible Technology, Physicians for Safe Technology, and Safer EMR's.

20. Plaintiff and Petitioner 5G Free California is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization based in Topanga, CA. 5G Free California serves the entire state but has a primary focus on Los Angeles

-6-FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND COMPLAINT County. The organization has approximately 50 active members and a mailing list of 1,600 subscribers. 5G Free California's mission is to educate and conduct outreach and advocacy on the effects of wireless radiation on the human environment and to support safer technology.

21. Plaintiff and Petitioner Children's Health Defense is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization located at 852 Franklin Ave., Suite 511, Franklin Lakes, NJ 07417 and incorporated under the laws of California. Its mission is to end health epidemics by working aggressively to eliminate harmful toxins in the human environment, hold those responsible accountable, and establish safeguards to prevent future harm through litigation, education, advocacy and scientific research. Children's Health Defense has 1,398 members in Los Angeles County.

22. Fiber First Los Angeles together with Mothers of East LA, Union Binacional de Organizaciones de Trabajadores Mexicanos Exbraceros 1942-1964, Boyle Heights Community Partners, United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in California, California Fires & Firefighters, Malibu for Safe Tech, EMF Safety Network, Californians for Safe Technology, 5G Free California, and Children's Health Defense are hereinafter collectively referred to as "Petitioners."

23. Defendant and Respondent County of Los Angeles is a local public agency. It is also the lead agency approving the Project, for purposes of CEQA and various state laws. The Project is within the jurisdictional limits of the County of Los Angeles.

24. Defendant and Respondent County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors is the elected legislative and decisionmaking body of the County of Los Angeles, which made the ultimate independent decision on the Project, including its CEQA determination.

25. Defendants and Respondents County of Los Angeles Regional Planning Commission, County of Los Angeles Department of Regional Planning, and County of Los Angeles Department of Public Works are all a department of the County of Los Angeles that are responsible for drafting the Ordinance and/or implementing it.

26. Defendants and Respondents County of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors, County of Los Angeles Regional Planning Commission, County of Los Angeles Department of Regional Planning, County of Los Angeles Department of Public Works are also real parties and are hereinafter collectively referred to as "County" or "Respondents."

27. Petitioners are ignorant of the true names and capacities of respondents and real parties sued herein as DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and therefore Petitioners sue said respondents and real parties in interest by those fictitious names. Petitioners will amend this First Amended Petition to allege their true names and capacities when the same have been ascertained. Petitioners allege that

each of these fictitiously named respondents is in some manner responsible for the wrongful conduct alleged in this first amended petition. Petitioners allege that these fictitiously named respondents were, at all times mentioned in this first amended petition, the agents, servants, and/or employees of their correspondents and were acting within their authority as such with the consent and permission of their correspondents.

28. Petitioners have a substantial interest in ensuring that the County's decisions are in conformity with the requirements of law and in having those requirements properly executed.
Petitioners will be adversely affected by impacts resulting from the County's actions as described herein. Petitioners are suing on their behalf and on behalf of others who will be affected in the County.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

29. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP") sections 526 (injunctive relief), 1060 (declaratory relief), 1085 (traditional mandate) and 1094.5 (administrative mandate), Public Resources Code sections 21168 and 21168.5 (judicial review under CEQA), and Government Code section 65009 (actions challenging local government decisions). The Court has jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief pursuant to CCP section 1060 and injunctive relief pursuant to CCP section 525 *et seq*.

30. Venue is proper in this Court because the Project Site lies entirely within the County of Los Angeles and the environmental impacts of the Project will be acutely felt in this County. The causes alleged in this Petition arise in this County. *See* CCP § 393; *see also Cal. State Parks Foundation v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 826. Venue is also proper in this Court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 394 (actions against a city, county, or local agency), and 395 (actions generally) since Respondents are in the County of Los Angeles.

31. The instant action is timely filed within all applicable limitation periods.

32. Petitioners have provided written notice of their intention to file this petition to Respondents in compliance with PRC section 21167.5, a true and correct copy of which notice, including the corresponding proof of service, is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

33. Petitioners have concurrently filed a notice of their election to prepare the record of administrative proceedings relating to this action, in compliance with PRC section 21167.6 or other applicable laws, a true and correct copy of which notice is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

34. Petitioners have concurrently filed a request for hearing in compliance with PRC section 21167.4, a true and correct copy of which request is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

35. Petitioners have concurrently filed and served notice of this lawsuit to the California

Attorney General in compliance with PRC section 21167.7 and CCP section 388, a true and correct copy of which notice is attached hereto as Exhibit D.

36. Petitioners have performed all conditions precedent to filing this instant action and have exhausted administrative remedies to the extent required by law under PRC section 21177. Petitioners and/or other agencies and/or individuals have raised each of the legal deficiencies asserted in this First Amended Petition orally or in writing during the Respondents' decision-making process.

37. The violations by Respondents as alleged herein have negatively affected the beneficial interests of Petitioners and/or their supporting members. The relief sought by way of this First Amended Petition will redress this beneficial interest and prevent the likelihood of future injury and interference with Petitioners' interests, and those of their supporting members.

38. Petitioners have no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the course of ordinary law unless this Court grants the requested Writ of Mandate to require Respondents to set aside the approval and certification of the Project and the corresponding CEQA Notice of Exemption published on or around February 2, 2023. In the absence of such remedies, Respondents' decisions will remain in effect in continuous violation of state laws and injurious to Petitioners and their members.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

The California Environmental Quality Act

39. In 1970, the California Legislature enacted the California Environmental Quality Act and declared the maintenance of a quality environment to be a matter of ongoing statewide concern.

40. Pursuant to CEQA, public agencies must give "major consideration...to preventing environmental damage, while providing a decent home and satisfying living environment for every Californian" when considering project approvals. PRC § 21000, subd. (g).

41. The foremost principle in interpreting CEQA is that the Legislature intended CEQA to be read so as to "afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language." *Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 390; *Communities for a Better Environment v. Cal. Resources Agency* (2002) 103 Cal. App. 4th 98, 109.

42. CEQA has four primary purposes. First, CEQA is designed to inform governmental decision makers and the public about the potential, significant environmental effects of a proposed project. CEQA Guidelines § 15002, subd. (a)(1). "Its purpose is to inform the public and its responsible officials of the environmental consequences of their decisions before they are made. Thus, [CEQA] 'protects not only the environment but also informed self-government." *Citizens of Goleta Valley v.*

Bd. of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 564.

43. Second, CEQA requires public agencies to identify ways that environmental damage can be avoided or significantly reduced. CEQA Guidelines § 15002, subd. (a)(2)

44. Third, Public agencies "should not approve projects as proposed if there are feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures available which would substantially lessen the environmental effects of such projects." PRC § 21002. That is, CEQA requires that public agencies prevent significant environmental damage by requiring "environmentally superior" alternatives and feasible mitigation measures. CEQA Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (a)(3); *Citizens of Goleta Valley, supra*, 52 Cal.3d at 564.

45. Fourth, CEQA requires public agencies to disclose to the public the reasons why it has approved the project in the manner the agency chose if significant environmental effects are involved. CEQA Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (a)(4).

46. "CEQA is a comprehensive scheme designed to provide long-term protection to the environment." *Save N. Petaluma River & Wetlands v. City of Petaluma* (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 207, 215 citing *Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com.* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 112.

47. To achieve its objectives of environmental protection, CEQA has a three-tiered structure. CEQA Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (k); *Comm. to Save the Hollywoodland Specific Plan v. City of Los Angeles* (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1185 – 86. First, if a project falls into an exempt category, or it can be seen with certainty that the activity in question will not have a significant effect on the environment, no further agency evaluation is required. *Id.* Second, if there is a possibility the project will have a significant effect on the environment, the agency must perform a threshold initial study. *Id.*; CEQA Guidelines, § 15063 subd. (a). If the study indicates that there is no substantial evidence that the project may cause a significant effect on the environment the agency may issue a negative declaration. *Id.*, CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15063, subd. (b)(2), 15070. Finally, if the project will have a significant effect on the environmental impact report ("EIR") is required. *Id.*

48. The EIR requirement "is the heart of CEQA." CEQA Guidelines § 15003, subd. (a). The EIR's function is to ensure that government officials who decide to build or approve a project do so with a full understanding of the environmental consequences and, equally important, that the public is assured those consequences have been considered. For the EIR to serve these goals it must present information so that the foreseeable impacts of pursuing the project can be understood and weighed, and the public must be given an adequate opportunity to comment on that presentation before the decision to go forward is made. *Communities for a Better Environment v. Richmond* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 70,

80, quoting *Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 449–450. As such, the EIR is an informational document that functions as "the primary means of achieving the Legislature's considered declaration that it is the policy of this state to 'take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environmental quality of the state.' *Save N. Petaluma River & Wetlands v. City of Petaluma* (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 207, 215.

Exemptions from CEQA Environmental Review

49. Activities exempt from CEQA are either expressly identified by statute (i.e., statutory exemptions, PRC § 21080.01 *et seq.*; CEQA Guidelines §§ 15261 - 85) or fall into one of the classes deemed categorically exempt by the Secretary of Resources (i.e., categorical exemptions). PRC § 21080, subd. (b)(10); CEQA Guidelines § 15300.

50. CEQA identifies certain classes of projects which are exempt from the provisions of CEQA. These are called categorical exemptions. PRC § 21084 (a); CEQA Guidelines §§ 15300, 15354. Categorical exemptions are certain classes of activities that generally do not have a significant effect on the environment. *Id.*

51. CEQA categorical exemptions must be "construed narrowly" and cannot be unreasonably expanded beyond their terms. *County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 931.

52. Exemptions are strictly construed to allow for the fullest possible environmental protections within the reasonable scope of statutory language. CEQA Guidelines § 15003, subd. (f); *Azusa Land Reclamation Co. v. Main San Gabriel Basin Watermaster* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1192 – 93; *East Peninsula Ed. Council, Inc. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School Dist.* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 155, 171; *Laurel Heights Improvement Assn.* v. *Regents of University of California* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 390 (rejecting "an attempt to use limited exemptions contained in CEQA as a means to subvert rules regulating the protection of the environment"). A reviewing court must "scrupulously enforce all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements." Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 564.

53. Public agencies utilizing CEQA exemptions must support their determination with substantial evidence. PRC § 21168.5; *see Fairbank v. City of Mill Valley* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1251, *as modified on denial of reh'g* (Oct. 29, 1999) ("substantial evidence test governs our review of the city's factual determination that a project falls within a categorical exemption"); *Banker's Hill, Hillcrest, Park W. Cmty. Pres. Grp. v. City of San Diego* (2006)139 Cal.App.4th 249, 267; *Davidon Homes v. City of San Jose* (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 106, 115, *as modified on denial of reh'g* (Apr. 29,

1997) ("On review, an agency's categorical exemption determination will be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence that the project fell within the exempt category of projects"); *Magan v. Cnty. of Kings* (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 468, 475, *as modified* (Jan. 13, 2003) (an agency "only has the burden to demonstrate substantial evidence that the ordinance fell within the exempt category of projects"); *San Lorenzo Valley Cmty. Advocs. for Responsible Educ. v. San Lorenzo Valley Unified Sch. Dist.* (2006)139 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1386; *Union of Med. Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1186; *Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano Cnty. Airport Land Use Com.* (2007) 41

Cal.4th 372, 380, 386-387, as modified (Sept. 12, 2007).

54. Respondents bear the burden to provide substantial evidence, which must be based upon facts, reasonable assumptions based on facts, and expert opinion, rather than mere speculation, to support their findings. CEQA Guidelines § 15384, subd. (a); *Save Our Big Trees v. City of Santa Cruz* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 694, 710-711 citing *Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com.* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 386.

55. Argument, speculation, unsubstantiated opinion or narrative, or evidence that is clearly inaccurate or erroneous, or evidence that is not credible, shall not constitute substantial evidence. Substantial evidence shall include facts, reasonable assumptions predicated upon facts, and expert opinion supported by facts. CEQA Guidelines § 15064, subd. (f)(5).

56. The determination of whether a project may have a significant effect on the environment calls for careful judgment on the part of the public agency involved, based to the extent possible on scientific and factual data. CEQA Guidelines § 15064 subd. (b)(1).

57. An activity which may not be significant in an urban area may be significant in a rural area. *Id*.

58. In determining whether an effect will be adverse or beneficial, the lead agency shall consider the views held by members of the public in all areas affected as expressed in the whole record before the lead agency. CEQA Guidelines § 15064, subd. (c).

59. In evaluating the significance of the environmental effect of a project, the lead agency shall consider direct physical changes in the environment which may be caused by the project and reasonably foreseeable indirect physical changes in the environment which may be caused by the project. CEQA Guidelines § 15064 subd. (d).

60. Economic and social effects of a physical change may be used to determine that the physical change is a significant effect on the environment. If the physical change causes adverse economic or social effects on people, those adverse effects may be used as a factor in determining

whether the physical change is significant. CEQA Guidelines § 15064, subd. (e).

61. The decision as to whether a project may have one or more significant effects shall be based on substantial evidence in the record of the lead agency. CEQA Guidelines 15064, subd. (f).

62. If there is substantial evidence, in light of the whole record before a lead agency, that a project may have a significant effect on the environment, the agency shall prepare a draft EIR. CEQA Guidelines § 15064, subd. (a)(1); *Friends of B Street v. City of Hayward* (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 988. Said another way, if a lead agency is presented with a fair argument that a project may have a significant effect on the environment, the lead agency shall prepare an EIR even though it may also be presented with other substantial evidence that the project will not have a significant effect. *Id.*; *No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles* (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68.

63. Erroneous reliance by the lead agency on a categorical exemption constitutes a prejudicial abuse of discretion and a violation of CEQA. *Azusa Land Reclamation Co. v. Main San Gabriel Basin Watermaster* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1192.

64. "[I]f the court perceives there was substantial evidence that the project might have an adverse impact, but the agency failed to secure preparation of an EIR, the agency's action must be set aside because the agency abused its discretion by failing to follow the law." *Dunn-Edwards Corp. v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 644, 656.

65. CEQA exemptions are reserved for projects without potential to have significant environmental effects. *See Salmon Protection & Watershed Network v. County of Marin* (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1107 ["If a project may have a significant effect on the environment, CEQA review must occur"].

66. "Significant effect upon the environment" is defined as "a substantial or potentially substantial adverse change in the environment." PRC § 21068; CEQA Guidelines § 15382. A project "may" have a significant effect on the environment if there is a "reasonable probability" that it will result in a significant impact. *No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles*, 13 Cal.3d at 83 fn. 16; *Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino* (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 296, 309.

67. If any aspect of the project may result in a significant impact on the environment, an EIR must be prepared even if the overall effect of the project is beneficial. CEQA Guidelines § 15063, subd. (b)(1). See *County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. County of Kern* (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1580. This standard sets a "low threshold" for preparation of an EIR. *Consolidated Irrig. Dist. v. City of Selma* (2012) 204 Cal. App. 4th 187, 207; *Nelson v. County of Kern* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 252; *Pocket Protectors v. City of Sacramento* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 903, 928; *Bowman v. City of Berkeley* (2004)

122 Cal.App.4th 572, 580; Citizen Action to Serve All Students v. Thornley (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 748, 754; Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 296, 310.

68. If substantial evidence in the record supports a fair argument that the project may have a significant environmental effect, the lead agency must prepare an EIR, even if other substantial evidence before it indicates the project will have no significant effect. *See Jensen v. City of Santa Rosa* (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 877, 886; *Clews Land & Livestock v. City of San Diego* (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 161, 183; *Stanislaus Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 144, 150; *Brentwood Ass'n for No Drilling, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 491; *Friends of "B" St. v. City of Hayward* (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 988; CEQA Guidelines § 15064 (f)(1).

Class 1 and Class 3 Categorical Exemptions

69. Pursuant to CEQA Guidelines section 15301, projects exempt under the Class 1 Categorical Exemption consist of the "operation, repair, maintenance, permitting, leasing, licensing, or minor alteration of existing public or private structures, facilities, mechanical equipment, or topographical features, involving negligible or no expansion of existing or former use." CEQA Guidelines § 15301.

70. Pursuant to CEQA Guidelines section 15303, projects exempt under the Class 3 Categorical Exemption consist of "construction and location of limited numbers of new, small facilities or structures; installation of small new equipment and facilities in small structures; and the conversion of existing small structures from one use to another where only minor modifications are made in the exterior of the structure." CEQA Guidelines § 15303.

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Exceptions to Categorical Exemptions

71. Certain types of projects are ineligible to be exempt from CEQA, even if they otherwise fit within a CEQA categorical exemption.

72. Categorical exemptions do not apply when the cumulative impact of successive projects of the same type and same place over time may be significant. CEQA Guidelines § 15300.2, subd. (b).

73. Projects that may adversely affect historical resources cannot be exempt from CEQA review. Subdivision (e) of Section 21084 of the California Public Resources Code states that "[a] project that may cause a substantial adverse change in the significance of a historical resource, as specified in Section 21084.1, shall not be exempted . . ." Section 21084.1 of the California Public Resources Code provides that "[a] project that may cause a substantial adverse change in the significance of an historical resource is a project that may have a significant effect on the environment. *See also* CEQA Guideline § 15300.2, subd. (f).

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74. CEQA Guidelines Section 15300.2, subdivision (a) limits Class 3 exemptions by location. A project that might otherwise be insignificant in its environmental impact may, in a particularly sensitive environment, be significant. CEQA Guidelines, § 15300.2, subd. (a). Such projects cannot be rendered categorically exempt. *See id.*

Planning & Zoning Law and Los Angeles County Code: General Plan Consistency

75. The Planning & Zoning Law, Cal Government Code 65000 *et seq* ("Planning & Zoning Law") requires each California city and county must adopt a comprehensive, long-term general plan governing development. *Napa Citizens for Honest Gov. v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 342, 352, citing Gov. Code §§ 65030, 65300. The general plan sits at the top of the land use planning hierarchy (*see DeVita v. County of Napa* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 773), and serves as a "constitution" or "charter" for all future development. *Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 531, 540.

76. General plan consistency is "the linchpin of California's land use and development laws; it is the principle which infused the concept of planned growth with the force of law." *See Debottari v. Norco City Council* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 1204, 1213.

77. State law mandates two levels of consistency. First, a general plan must be internally or "horizontally" consistent: its elements must "comprise an integrated, internally consistent and compatible statement of policies for the adopting agency." *See* Gov. Code § 65300.5; *Sierra Club v. Bd. of Supervisors* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 698, 704. A general plan amendment thus may not be internally inconsistent, nor may it cause the general plan as a whole to become internally inconsistent. *See DeVita*, 9 Cal.4th at 796 fn. 12.

78. Second, state law requires "vertical" consistency, meaning that zoning ordinances and other land use decisions also must be consistent with the general plan. *See* Gov. Code § 65860, subd. (a)(2) (land uses authorized by zoning ordinance must be "compatible with the objectives, policies, general land uses, and programs specified in the [general] plan."); *see also Neighborhood Action Group v. County of Calaveras* (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1176, 1184.

79. A zoning ordinance that conflicts with the general plan or impedes achievement of its policies is invalid and cannot be given effect. *See Lesher*, 52 Cal.3d at 544.

80. State law requires that all subordinate land use decisions, including conditional use permits, be consistent with the general plan. *See* Gov. Code § 65860(a)(2); *Neighborhood Action Group*, 156 Cal.App.3d at 1184.

81. Los Angeles County Code ("County Code") section 22.244.040.B requires ordinance

amendments to be consistent with the Los Angeles County General Plan 2035 ("General Plan").

82. County Code section 22.02.050 also requires land use consistency with the General Plan. It reads: "Notwithstanding the current zone classification applicable to any lot, if that zone classification does not conform to the General Plan affecting the same lot, then building permits may be issued only for those land uses which are authorized by both the zone and the objectives, policies, and land uses specified in the General Plan."

83. A project cannot be found consistent with a general plan if it conflicts with a general plan policy that is "fundamental, mandatory, and clear," regardless of whether it is consistent with other general plan policies. *See Endangered Habitats League v. County of Orange* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 777, 782-83; *Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural El Dorado County v. Bd. of Supervisors* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1341-42. Moreover, even in the absence of such a direct conflict, an ordinance or development project may not be approved if it interferes with or frustrates the general plan's policies and objectives. *See Napa Citizens*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 378-79; *see also Lesher*, 52 Cal.3d at 544 (zoning ordinance restricting development conflicted with growth-oriented policies of general plan).

State Law Requirements: Colocation of Wireless Facilities

84. California Government Code section 65850.6(a) states that a colocation facility is a permitted use not subject to a county discretionary permit if: (1) the colocation facility is consistent with requirements for the wireless telecommunications colocation facility pursuant to subdivision (b) on which the colocation facility is proposed; and (2) "the wireless telecommunications colocation facility on which the colocation facility is proposed was subject to a discretionary permit by the city or county and an environmental impact report was certified, or a negative declaration or mitigated negative declaration was adopted for the wireless telecommunications colocation facility in compliance with [CEQA]" and "the colocation facility incorporates required mitigation measures specified in that environmental impact report, negative declaration, or mitigated negative declaration."

85. California Government Code section 65850.6(b) states that wireless telecommunications colocation facilities, where a subsequent colocation facility is a permitted use not subject to a city or county discretionary permit pursuant to subdivision (a), must be subject to a city or county discretionary permit and must, among other things, comply with CEQA "through certification of an environmental impact report, or adoption of a negative declaration or mitigated negative declaration."

86. Government Code section 65850.6(c) mandates notice pursuant to Government Code 65091 and "at least one public hearing on the discretionary permit" required by Section 65850.6(b) for wireless telecommunications colocation facilities.

County of Los Angeles Legislative Land Use and Zoning Process

87. A zoning ordinance or an amendment to a zoning ordinance, which amendment changes any property from one zone to another or imposes any regulation listed in California Government Code section 65850 not theretofore imposed or otherwise removes or modifies any such regulation, must be adopted in the manner set forth in California Government Code sections 65854 to 65857. Cal. Gov't Code § 65853.

88. California Government Code section 65850 states that the legislative body of any county or city may adopt ordinances that do any of the following: (a) Regulate the use of buildings, structures, and land as between industry, business, residences, open space, including agriculture, recreation, enjoyment of scenic beauty, use of natural resources, and other purposes; (b) Regulate signs and billboards; (c) Regulate all of the following: (1) The location, height, bulk, number of stories, and size of buildings and structures; (2) The size and use of lots, yards, courts, and other open spaces; (3) The percentage of a lot which may be occupied by a building or structure; and (4) The intensity of land use; (d) Establish requirements for off-street parking and loading; (e) Establish and maintain building setback lines; and (f) Create civic districts around civic centers, public parks, public buildings, or public grounds, and establish regulations for those civic districts.

89. The planning commission must hold a public hearing on the proposed zoning ordinance or amendment to a zoning ordinance. Cal. Gov. Code § 65854. Notice of the hearing shall be given pursuant to California Government Code section 65090 and, if the proposed ordinance or amendment to a zoning ordinance affects the permitted uses of real property, notice shall also be given pursuant to California Government Code section 65091. *Id*.

90. After the hearing, the planning commission shall render its decision in the form of a written recommendation to the legislative body. Cal. Gov. Code § 65855. Such recommendation shall include the reasons for the recommendation, the relationship of the proposed ordinance or amendment to applicable general and specific plans, and shall be transmitted to the legislative body in such form and manner as may be specified by the legislative body. *Id*.

91. Upon receipt of the recommendation of the planning commission, the legislative body shall notice and hold a public hearing. Cal. Gov. Code § 65856.

92. Los Angeles County Code section 22.244.010 provides that an ordinance amendment may be initiated to alter the boundaries of districts, to impose regulations not previously imposed, or to remove or modify any regulation already imposed by Title 22.

93. County Code § 22.244.030 states that ordinance amendments in Los Angeles County

must be processed in compliance with Chapter 22.232.

94. County Code section 22.232 requires the Planning Commission to review the legislative application for an ordinance amendment at a public hearing and make a recommendation to the Board of Supervisors. If the Planning Commission recommends approval, the Board of Supervisors must review the application at a public hearing.

95. For an ordinance amendment, any modification of the recommendation of the Planning Commission by the Board of Supervisors that was not previously considered by the Planning Commission during its hearing shall first be referred to the Planning Commission for report and recommendation. County Code § 22.232.040.B.2.a.

Unlawful Precommitment and Prejudicial Effect of Designating Actions as Ministerial, Including under CEQA

96. A "'[d]iscretionary project' means a project which requires the exercise of judgment or deliberation when the public agency or body decides to approve or disapprove a particular activity, as distinguished from situations where the public agency or body merely has to determine whether there has been conformity with applicable statutes, ordinances, regulations, or other fixed standards. The key question is whether the public agency can use its subjective judgment to decide whether and how to carry out or approve a project." CEQA Guidelines § 15357, *see* CEQA Guidelines, § 15369.

97. "Ministerial" describes a governmental decision involving little or no personal judgment by the public official as to the wisdom or manner of carrying out the project. The public official merely applies the law to the facts as presented but uses no special discretion or judgment in reaching a decision. A ministerial decision involves only the use of fixed standards or objective measurements, and the public official cannot use personal, subjective judgment in deciding whether or how the project should be carried out. Common examples of ministerial permits include automobile registrations, dog licenses, and marriage licenses. CEQA Guidelines §15369.

98. If the law requires an agency "to act on a project in a set way without allowing the agency to use its own judgment," the project is ministerial. CEQA Guidelines, §15002, subd. (i)(1).

99. The concept of "discretionary" versus "ministerial" actions has also been applied outside of the CEQA context: "An act is ministerial when it is the doing of a certain thing that is unqualifiedly required. In other words, where the law prescribes and defines the duties to be performed by a public officer with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment, the act is ministerial. (52 Cal.Jur.3d, Public Officers, § 170, p. 333, fns. omitted.)...[a] "ministerial project" is one which requires no exercise of discretion by a public agency. We therefore conclude a

"ministerial project" is one which requires no exercise of discretion by a public agency." *Findleton v. Board of Supervisors* (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 709, 713.

100. Designating an action ministerial automatically makes such actions subject to challenges under Code of Civil Procedure § 1085, inherently depriving the public of the opportunity to challenge an agency's decisions unless such decisions can be proven to be arbitrary and capricious. "Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 [...], "authorizes a trial court to issue a writ of mandate to compel an act which the law specifically requires. A petitioner ... is required to show the existence of two elements: a clear, present and usually ministerial duty upon the part of the respondent, and a clear, present and beneficial right belonging to the petitioner in the performance of that duty." (*Yoo v. Shewry* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 131, 144 [111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 322] [regarding a petition about a dispute with the Department over Medi-Cal payments].)" (*California Assn. of Medical Products Suppliers v. Maxwell-Jolly* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 286, 302.)

101. Critically, "In reviewing such a petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, a trial court's role generally is to 'determine whether the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or without evidentiary support, and/or whether it failed to conform to the law. The trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency or force the agency to exercise its discretion in a certain way.' (*Association of Irritated Residents v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dist.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 535, 542 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 590] (*Irritated Residents*).) In considering the validity of regulations, the courts' function is to inquire into the legality of the regulations, not their wisdom.' (*Morris v. Williams* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 733, 737 [63 Cal. Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697] [reviewing Medi-Cal regulations].)" (*California Assn. of Medical Products Suppliers v. Maxwell-Jolly* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 286, 302-303.) As such, designating an action as ministerial automatically and significantly raises the burden of proof for anyone challenging such actions.

Constitutional and Statutory Due Process

102. A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.

103. Due process requires that deprivation of property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing. *Scott v. City of Indian Wells* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 541, 549 citing *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.* (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 313. That is, governmental decisions which are adjudicative in nature are subject to procedural due process principles. *Horn v. Cnty. of Ventura* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 612 (citing *Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co.* (1950) 339 U.S. 306,

313; Franchise Tax Board v. Superior Court (1950) 36 Cal. 2d 538, 549; Beck v. City Council of

Beverly Hills (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 112, 115).

104. Administrative zoning decisions, such as the grant of a variance or the award of a conditional use permit, are adjudicatory in nature. *San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. City Council* (1974) 13 Cal.3d 205, 211.

105. Due process principles require reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard before governmental deprivation of a significant property interest. *Horn v. Cnty. of Ventura* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 612 citing *North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.* (1975) 419 U.S. 601, 605-606; *Goss v. Lopez* (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 572-576; *Board of Regents v. Roth* (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 576-577; *Boddie v. Connecticut* (1971) 401 U.S. 371, 379; *Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.* (1969) 395 U.S. 337, 339; *Skelly v. State Personnel Bd.* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 206-207; *Beaudreau v. Superior Court* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458; *Randone v. Appellate Department* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536, 541.

106. Land use decisions which "substantially affect" the property rights of owners of adjacent parcels may constitute "deprivations" of property within the context of procedural due process. *Horn v. Cnty. of Ventura* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 615, citing *Scott v. City of Indian Wells* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 541, 548–49.

Unlawful Delegation of Legislative Power to Non-Elected Decisionmakers, Including Under CEQA

107. The doctrine prohibiting delegation of legislative power is well established in California. *Kugler v. Yocum* (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371, 375.

108. A legislature's delegation of unbridled discretion to an administrative agency is invalid.
State Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 436, 448; Kugler v.
Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371, 375-377; Stoddard v. Edelman (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 544, 548.

109. "[T]he purpose of the doctrine that legislative power cannot be delegated is to assure that truly fundamental issues will be resolved by the legislature and that a grant of authority is accompanied by safeguards adequate to prevent its abuse." *Kugler v. Yocum* (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371, 376. "This doctrine rests upon the premise that the legislative body must itself effectively resolve the truly fundamental issues. It cannot escape responsibility by explicitly delegating that function to others or by failing to establish an effective mechanism to assure the proper implementation of its policy decisions." *Id.* at 376-377.

110. The doctrine applies where the legislative body of a city attempts to delegate its lawmaking functions. *Kugler, supra,* 69 Cal.2d at 375; *Stoddard v. Edelman* (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 544, 548.

111. A board of supervisors is a "legislative" body. Horn v. Cnty. of Ventura (1979) 24

Cal.3d 605, 614.

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112. To avoid delegating unbridled discretion, it is necessary that the delegating statute establish an ascertainable standard to guide the administrative body. *State Board of Dry Cleaners* v. *Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc.* (1953) 40 Cal.2d 436, 448; *Kugler, supra,* 69 Cal.2d at 375-377; *Stoddard v. Edelman* (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 544, 548.

113. In addition to sufficiently clear standards, a statute delegating legislative power must be accompanied by "safeguards adequate to prevent its abuse." *Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agric. Lab. Rels. Bd.* (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1118, 1150-1151; *Monsanto Co. v. Off. of Env't Health Hazard Assessment* (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 534, 557-558. That is, the statute must also be coupled with adequate protections against arbitrary actions or abuse of the delegated authority. *Id.* Such safeguards can include the joint selection of a mediator, potential review avenues, and/or ultimately an ability to challenge the determination in court. *Id.*

CEQA similarly precludes delegation of project approval and CEQA determinations 114. from the elected decisionmakers to the non-elected ones and requires that, in any case, decisions by non-elected decisionmakers be reviewed by and appealed to the elected ones. Specifically, CEOA Guidelines § 15025(a) provides that "A public agency may assign specific functions to its staff to assist in administering CEQA." Among such "specific functions" are determinations as to whether the project is exempt from CEQA, preparing an EIR or mitigated negative declaration, filing notices, and others. Guidelines § 15025(a)(1)-(6). However, CEQA Guidelines § 15025(b) prohibits delegation of any approval of an EIR or a Mitigated Negative Declaration, as well as findings and statement of overriding considerations from the elected decisionmakers to the non-elected ones: "The decision-making body of a public agency shall not delegate the following functions..." But even as to the exemption determinations that CEQA does not expressly prohibit delegation under CEQA Guidelines § 15025(b), CEQA still provides and mandates an appeal procedure to the elected decisionmakers under CEQA Guidelines, 15601(e): "[w]hen a non-elected official or decisionmaking body of a local agency decides that a project is exempt from CEQA, and the public agency approves or determines to carry out the project, the decision that the project is exempt may be appealed to the local lead agency's elected decisionmaking body."

115. As related, CEQA Guidelines § 15004(a), "Before granting any approval of a project subject to CEQA, every Lead Agency or Responsible Agency shall consider a final EIR or Negative Declaration or another document authorized by these Guidelines to be used in the place of an EIR or Negative Declaration. (See: The definition of "approval" in Section 15352.)"

1	116. In turn, CEQA Guidelines § 15352 defines approval as:				
2		(a)	agency	oval" means the decision by a public agency which commits the to a definite course of action in regard to a project intended to be	
3				out by any person. The exact date of approval of any project is a determined by each public agency according to its rules, regulations,	
4				dinances. Legislative action in regard to a project often constitutes	
5	117.				
6	including an indirect action by the agency, that may have a direct or reasonably foreseeable indirect				
7	significant environmental impacts:				
8	(a) "Project" means the whole of an action, which has a potential for resulting				
9 10	in either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment, and that is any of the following:				
11			(1)	An activity directly undertaken by any public agency including but	
12				not limited to public works construction and related activities clearing or grading of land, improvements to existing public	
13				structures, enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances, and the adoption and amendment of local General Plans or elements thereof	
14				pursuant to Government Code Sections 65100-65700.	
15 16			(2)	An activity undertaken by a person which is supported in whole or in part through public agency contacts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of assistance from one or more public agencies.	
17			(3)	An activity involving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies."	
18	118. CEQA Guidelines § 15061(b) lists exempt projects, which list does not include				
19	ordinances, or design checklists.				
20	STATEMENT OF FACTS				
21	Procedural History of Ordinance Approval				
22	119. Prior to adoption of the Ordinance, the policy of the Department of Regional Planning				
23	required a Conditional Use Permit ("CUP") for a wireless facility, and to process wireless facility				
24	applications similarly to radio and television towers. The Conditional Use Permitting process under the				
25	County Code is a discretionary process for reviewing applications and requires "additional				
26	consideration to ensure proper integration with the surrounding community." County Code §§				
27	22.158.010; 22.230.010. An application for a CUP requires a public hearing and public notification of				
28	the application by publication, mail, and a sign posted on the property. County Code §§ 22.230.010; 22.230.040. Application requirements are specifically delineated in County Code sections 22.222.060,				
		11	1.		

22.222.070, 22.222.080, 22.222.090, and 22.222.110 and must conform to the same before an application can be deemed complete and approved. County Code § 22.230.030.

120. On March 5, 2019, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors instructed the Director of the Department of Regional Planning of the County of Los Angeles ("Director") to prepare an ordinance that defines and establishes standards for the location, height, and design of wireless communication facilities; conduct outreach to residents, the wireless communication facilities industry and other interested parties; prepare an appropriate environmental document for the ordinance in compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act and the County's environmental review procedures; and present the ordinance and environmental document to the Regional Planning Commission and the Board of Supervisors for consideration at their respective public hearings.

121. At its public hearing on March 23, 2022, the Department of Regional Planning presented amendments to Title 22 of the County Code ("Title 22 Amendments") to the Regional Planning Commission, and the Regional Planning Commission recommended approval of the Title 22 Amendments to the Board of Supervisors over vigorous public opposition. Amendments to Title 16 of the County Code were not presented to the Regional Planning Commission, and the Regional Planning Commission did not render a recommendation of the same.

122. On March 23, 2022, the County Department of Regional Planning issued a Proposed Environmental Determination ("Environmental Determination"), which reads:

Los Angeles County ("County") completed an initial review for the above-mentioned project. Based on examination of the project proposal and the supporting information included for the project, the County proposes that an Exemption is the appropriate environmental documentation under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).

This project (Ordinance) qualifies for a Categorical Exemption, (Class 1 – Existing Facilities, and Class 3 – New Construction or Conversion of Small Structures) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and County environmental guidelines. The project includes authorization for modifications to existing facilities as well as for minor alterations to land with the construction or conversion of small structures. Both actions will not have a significant effect on the environment.

123. On November 15, 2022, the Department of Regional Planning declared that the Project falls "within a class of projects that have been determined not to have a significant effect on the environment and which meet the criteria for [Class 1 and Class 3 Exemptions from CEQA review]." November 15, 2022, Los Angeles County Department of Regional Planning Letter to Board of Supervisors, page 5. The Department of Regional Planning did not provide any evidence to substantiate its claim in the Environmental Determination that the Project is exempt under Class 1 and Class 3 Exemptions from CEQA review. *See id*. 124. At its public hearing on November 15, 2022, the Board of Supervisors discussed the Project with County staff and accepted public comment. The Board of Supervisors passed a motion indicating its intent to approve the Project and made a finding that the Project is exempt from CEQA.

125. At its public hearing on December 6, 2022, the Board of Supervisors discussed the Project with County staff and accepted public comment. The hearing was continued to: (i) a closed session on December 20, 2022, and (ii) a public hearing on January 10, 2023.

126. On January 3, 2023, the County staff proposed revisions and amendments to the Ordinance. These revisions and amendments were made public on or around January 5, 2023, in the agenda report in advance of the January 10, 2023, Board of Supervisors hearing. Such revisions and amendments include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Section 16.25.030.B.2 of the Ordinance was revised to include language authorizing the road commissioner of the County ("Commissioner") to amend a design standards checklist and permit conditions for small cell facilities and eligible facilities requests. It was also revised to require an applicant to comply with public notification requirements as set forth in the design standards checklist.

- b. Section 16.25.040.E of the Ordinance was revised to include: (i) a requirement that owners of and those with issued permits (i.e., permit holders) for small cell facilities comply with all applicable public safety requirements; (ii) a prohibition stating that no small cell facility or combination of small cell facilities shall produce exposure levels that exceed the applicable FCC Standards for radio frequency emissions.
 - c. Section 16.25.050.I of the Ordinance was revised to include a requirement that all small cell facilities be designed and installed to ensure that the facilities and supporting structures meet minimum standards for public safety and that such facilities are maintained to prevent electrical and fire hazards.
 - d. Section 22.140.760.D.4 was added to the Ordinance: "For every new application, the applicant shall provide all of the required materials listed on either the Land Use Application Checklist Small Cell Facilities ("SCF"), Collocation and Eligible Facilities Requests ("EFR"), or the Zoning Permit Instructions and Checklist, whichever is applicable, and

which may be periodically modified by the Director, including a report on the individual and cumulative radio frequency emissions levels of each wireless facility demonstrating that such emissions comply with adopted FCC guidelines. All applications shall provide proof of liability insurance for each facility covered by the application, and the applicant must comply with the public notification requirements as set forth in said Checklists."

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- e. Section 22.140.760.D.5 was added to the Ordinance: "Pre-application consultation. Prior to submitting an application pursuant to this Subsection D to install or modify a wireless facility subject to this Section, the applicant is encouraged to schedule a voluntary pre-application meeting with the Department to discuss the proposed facility, the requirements of this Section, applicable checklists and guidelines, and any potential impacts of the proposed facility. The pre-application meeting shall not initiate any applicable time period as specified by applicable law, including any FCC-issued order(s), for the application."
- f. Section 22.140.760.E.1.b.v was added to the Ordinance: "The locating of new facilities shall take into consideration the least aesthetically intrusive location."
- g. Section 22.140.760.E.1.e.i was added to the Ordinance: "Safety standards. All wireless facility shall be designed by qualified, licensed persons to meet minimum standards for public safety, and shall comply with all applicable legal requirements, including the County Building and Fire Codes. All wireless facilities should be proactively monitored and maintained to ensure compliance with the safety design."

 h. Section 22.140.760.E.1.e.ii. was added to the Ordinance: "No facility or combination of facilities shall produce at any time exposure levels in any general population area that exceed the applicable FCC standards for radiofrequency (RF) emissions."

Section 22.14.760.M was added to the Ordinance: "Abandonment. If a wireless facility has ceased to operate for a period of 90 consecutive days, the facility shall be considered abandoned. Any permit or other approvals associated with that facility shall be deemed terminated and discontinued,

unless before the end of the 90-dav period, the Director determines that the facility has resumed operations or an application has been submitted to transfer the approval to another operator. After 90 consecutive days of non-operation, the owner of, or permittee for, the facility shall remove the abandoned wireless facility and restore the site to its original condition. Said owner or permittee shall provide written verification to the Department of the removal of the facility within 30 days of the date the removal is completed. If the facility is not removed within 30 days after the permit/approval has been terminated pursuant to this Subsection, the wireless facility shall be deemed to be a nuisance, and the County may cause the wireless facility to be removed at the expense of the owner/operator or by calling any bond or other financial assurance to pay for removal."

127. The revised and amended Ordinance was not remanded to the Planning Commission for review, report, and recommendation.

128. At its hearing on January 10, 2023, the Board of Supervisors approved the revised and amended Ordinance.

129. On or around January 25, 2023, the Planning Department released a "Small Cell Wireless Communications Facilities Design Standards Self-Assessment Checklist." This Checklist addresses wireless facilities now subject to Title 16 and facilities not on county infrastructure or on county highways. This Checklist was not circulated for public comment. The Commissioner made several subjective and policy decisions while formulating this document. It is unclear why the Planning Department form covers matters now assigned to Public Works.

130. On or around January 25, 2023, the Planning Department released a "Land Use Application Checklist - Small Cell Facilities ("SCF"), Collocations and Eligible Facilities Requests ("EFR"). This Checklist was not circulated for public comment. The Commissioner made several subjective and policy decisions while formulating this document, including but not limited to (1) insurance coverage requirements, and (2) the notice radius that will be used, if notice is to be required at all. The Checklist also notes that:

a. If the facility to be installed is within a Fire Hazard Severity Zone as determined by Cal Fire https://osfm.fire.ca.gov/fhsz-maps, a report that details measures employed to mitigate any fire hazards posed by the facility to surrounding vegetation and/or structures.

b.

If the proposed facility will be located on property containing a historic

resource, a Historic Resource Assessment may be required.

c. The Director of Regional Planning retains the discretion to determine whether the proposed SCF is in compliance with the design standards set forth below.

131. On or around February 7, 2023, the Department of Public Works published a "Small Cell Facility in Public Right of Way Design Standards Checklist." This Checklist was not circulated for public comment. The Commissioner made several subjective and policy decisions while formulating this document, including but not limited to (1) insurance coverage requirements, (2) the minimum distance a facility must be from residential windows, (3) size limitations, (4) the particular safety standards that apply and (5) certain aesthetics requirements. These specifics were not contained in the Ordinance.

The Ordinance

132. The Ordinance provides that small cell facilities may be built on new infrastructure. County Code §§ 16.25.030.B.3; 16.25.040.A.1.a; 16.25.040.A.1.b; 16.25.040.A.2; 16.25.040.D; 16.25.050.C; 22.140.760.E.1.b.iv; 22.140.760.I.3; and 22.140.760.I.4. That is, new support structures may be constructed to serve these facilities. *See id*.

133. The Ordinance provides that macro facilities may be built on new infrastructure. County Code §§ 22.140.760.D.2.a; 22.140.760.E.1.b.iv; 22.140.760.I.3; and 22.140.760.I.4.

134. The Ordinance states that EFRs include collocated wireless facilities. County Code § 16.25.020.E.

135. The Ordinance states that a wireless facility can be built up to 75 feet in height in industrial, rural, agricultural, open space, resort-recreation, and watershed zones. County Code § 22.140.760.E.1.c.i.

136. The Ordinance states that a wireless facility used to provide wireless services on a temporary basis can be up to 200 feet in height for up to 6 months. County Code § 22.14.230.

137. The Ordinance does not provide an estimate of the quantity of structures that will be allowed to be built throughout the County.

138. The Ordinance does not limit the amount of small cell facilities that can be built and/or implemented pursuant to the Project, including facilities to be located in a highway designated as a Scenic Highway in the County General Plan or to be located within the boundaries of a Significant Ecological Area, Significant Ridgeline, or Coastal Zone.

139. The Ordinance does not limit the amount of new macro facilities that can be built and/or implemented pursuant to the Project, including facilities to be located in a highway designated as a

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Scenic Highway in the County General Plan or to be located within the boundaries of a Significant Ecological Area, Significant Ridgeline, or Coastal Zone.

140. The Ordinance provides that new towers and support structures may be installed on the grounds of properties listed or eligible for listing on the National, California, or County historic registers. County Code § 22.140.760.E.1.b.iv.

141. For facilities located on a site containing an eligible resource, the Ordinance states that the Director may require a historic resource assessment to identify impacts to historic resources and identify mitigation to minimize impacts. *Id*. The Ordinance does not mandate the Director to require such assessment. *See id*.

142. The Ordinance does not contain any identifiable mitigation or protective measures against development on historical, cultural, or paleontological resources.

143. The Ordinance does not address, identify, or assess the cumulative impacts resulting from the implementation of multiple wireless facilities that may occur in the same location over time.

144. The Ordinance does not prohibit multiple wireless facilities from being implemented in the same location.

145. Section 16.25.030.B.2 of the Ordinance grants the Commissioner with authority to "adopt and amend a design standards checklist and permit conditions for SCFs and EFRs."

146. Section 16.25.030.B.3 of the Ordinance grants authority to the Commissioner to approve or disapprove of an applicant's engineered plans for small cell facilities that are to be mounted on new or replacement County infrastructure.

147. Section 16.25.030.B.7 of the Ordinance grants authority to the Commissioner to grant a permit "when the commissioner is satisfied" that the small cell facility or eligible facilities request meets all applicable requirements for a permit.

148. Section 16.25.030.B.8 of the Ordinance provides that the Commissioner's decision on an application submitted "shall be the final action of the County."

149. Section 16.25.050 of the Ordinance requires small cell facilities to comply with the design standards checklist adopted by the Commissioner.

150. Section 16.25.050.C of the Ordinance provides the Commissioner with approval of the structural analysis of the effect of placement of small cell facilities on County infrastructure, including wind impacts on traffic signal poles and mast arms of traffic signals, to ensure there is no overburden on County infrastructure.

151. Section 22.140.760.D.4 of the Ordinance provides the Director with authority to

periodically modify the Land Use Application Checklist – Small Cell Facilities, Collocation Eligible Facilities Requests, and the Zoning Permit Instructions and Checklist.

152. Section 22.140.760.E.1.b.iv of the Ordinance states: "A historic resource assessment, prepared to the satisfaction of the Director by a qualified architectural historian, may be required for a facility to be located on a site containing an eligible resource to identify impacts to historic resources, and identify mitigation to minimize impacts."

153. The Ordinance provides that if a zone or land use category within a Specific Plan is silent with regard to wireless facilities, the Director may accept an application for a wireless facility if the Director determines that a wireless facility is similar to another use permitted within such zone of land use category. County Code § 22.26.030.B.3.

154. If a wireless facility is in compliance with Section 22.140.760.D.1 of the Ordinance, the Director may accept a Ministerial Site Plan Review application (Chapter 22.186). County Code § 22.26.030.B.3.a.

155. Section 22.140.760.D.1 of the Ordinance states that a Ministerial Site Plan Review (Chapter 22.186) application is required to authorize the installation and operation of a macro facility on an existing base station or tower that meets all standards in section 22.140.760.E of the Ordinance and does not require a waiver.

156. Pursuant to section 22.140.760.G.1 of the Ordinance, existing macro facilities may be eligible for a Ministerial Site Plan Review (Chapter 22.186) application if such facilities are redesigned with shorter mounting equipment that extends no more than two feet from the structure, or with removal of any existing mounting equipment, and with additional screening techniques, such as shrouds or walls, that blend in with the structure, including color and texture, and conforms to all standards in section 22.140.760.E of the Ordinance and does not require a waiver.

157. Pursuant to section 22.140.760.G.3 of the Ordinance, Eligible Facilities Requests may be processed with a Ministerial Site Plan Review (Chapter 22.186) application if minor modifications will bring the facility in conformance with all standards in 22.140.760.E of the Ordinance and does not require a waiver.

158. Section 22.140.760.D.1.a of the Ordinance states "A Ministerial Site Plan Review (Chapter 22.186) application is required to authorize [the] [i]nstallation and operation of a small cell facility located on private property."

Los Angeles County General Plan 2035

159. Guiding Principle 1 of the General Plan "[p]rotect[s] and conserve[s] the County's

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natural and cultural resources, including the character of rural communities. In rural areas, land uses and developments that are compatible with the natural environment and landscape will maintain existing community character. These work in conjunction with other smart growth strategies to 'green' streets and buildings, and protect and conserve natural resources."

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160. Policy C/NR 3.11 of the General Plan "[d]iscourage[s] development in riparian habitats, streambeds, wetlands, and other native woodlands in order to maintain and support their preservation in a natural state, unaltered by grading, fill, or diversion activities."

161. Policy C/NR 13.1 of the General Plan "[p]rotect[s] scenic resources through land use regulations that mitigate development impacts."

162. Policy C/NR 13.2 of the General Plan"[p]rotect[s] ridgelines from incompatible development that diminishes their scenic value."

163. Policy C/NR 14.1 of the General Plan "[m]itigate[s] all impacts from new development on or adjacent to historic, cultural, and paleontological resources to the greatest extent feasible."

164. Policy C/NR 14.2 of the General Plan "[s]upport[s] an inter-jurisdictional collaborative system that protects and enhances historic, cultural, and paleontological resources."

165. Policy C/NR 14.6 of the General Plan "[e]nsure[s] proper notification and recovery processes are carried out for development on or near historic, cultural, and paleontological resources."

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(By Petitioners Against Respondents For Writ of Administrative Mandate Under CCP § 1094.5 and PRC §21168 Or in the Alternative CCP § 1085 and PRC § 21168.5 Re: Project Ineligibility for CEQA Exemptions)

166. Petitioners hereby reallege and incorporate all the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

167. Respondents violated CEQA by unlawfully exempting the Ordinance from environmental review under the Class 1 and Class 3 categorical exemptions, as the Ordinance neither facially fits collectively nor individually within either the Class 1 or Class 3 categorical exemptions, and is not eligible to be categorically exempted from environmental review under CEQA.

168. Public agencies may exempt projects requiring the "operation, repair, maintenance, permitting, leasing, licensing, or minor alteration of existing public or private structures, facilities, mechanical equipment, or topographical features, involving negligible or no expansion of existing or former use" from CEQA environmental review under the "Class 1" CEQA categorical exemption. CEQA Guidelines § 15301. 169. In addition, public agencies may also exempt projects involving the "construction and location of limited numbers of new, small facilities or structures; installation of small new equipment and facilities in small structures; and the conversion of existing small structures from one use to another where only minor modifications are made in the exterior of the structure" from CEQA environmental review under the "Class 3" CEQA categorical exemption. CEQA Guidelines § 15303.

170. However, CEQA prohibits projects from being categorically exempted from environmental review under the Class 3, 4, 5, 6 and 11 exemptions if the Project is located in an area with an environmental resource of hazardous or critical concern. CEQA Guidelines § 15300.2(a).

171. In addition, CEQA prohibits agencies from categorically exempting projects from environmental review if the Project may result in a significant environmental impact due to unusual circumstances. In addition, projects may not be categorically exempted from CEQA environmental review if the impact of successive projects of the same type in the same place may cumulatively impact the environment, if the project may impact a scenic resource, hazardous waste site or a historical resource. *Id.* 15300.2 (b – f).

172. The Ordinance is ineligible to be exempt from CEQA under section 15301 of the CEQA Guidelines because the Project is <u>facially</u> inconsistent with the exemption as:

a. The Project does not facially qualify for the Class 1 Exemption since the key consideration is that such actions would occur to *existing* facilities. As the Ordinance makes abundantly clear, small cell facilities may be built on *new* infrastructure. This means that, under the Ordinance, new support structures may be constructed to serve these facilities. Thus, such development is not exempted under section 15301.

173. The Ordinance is ineligible to be exempt from CEQA under section 15303 of the CEQA Guidelines as the Project is <u>facially</u> inconsistent with the exemption as the Project does not facially qualify for the Class 3 Exemption since only a project proposing a *limited* number of new, small facilities or structures can be exempted from environmental review under CEQA. The County failed to demonstrate the *amount* or *number* of structures that could be implemented in the same "location" or in multiple "locations" under the Ordinance. A large number of facilities will be built throughout the County pursuant to the Project. Because a categorical exemption should be interpreted to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within a reasonable scope of the statutory language, the

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b. Similarly, pursuant to the Ordinance, large macro facilities may also be built. Thus, such development is not exempted under section 15301.

Project does not satisfy this exemption.

174. The Ordinance is ineligible to be exempt from CEQA under section 15303 because CEQA Guidelines section 15300.2, subdivision a, limits Class 3 exemptions by location. A project that might otherwise be insignificant in its environmental impact may, in a particularly sensitive environment, be significant. CEQA Guidelines, § 15300.2, subd. (a). Los Angeles County is replete with an extensive host of biological resources and environmentally sensitive habitats, with 4,000 distinct species of plants and animals and 52 endangered species. The location of the construction, implementation, and operation of wireless facilities pursuant to the Project poses a substantial risk to the wildlife, habitats, and biodiversity extended through the County.

175. The Project is ineligible to be exempt from CEQA under sections 15301 and 15303 because categorical exemptions do not apply when the cumulative impact of successive projects of the same type and same place over time may be significant. Because there is no limitation to the amount or number of facilities that can be built within the same location, a conglomerate or cluster of such facilities may result in a single area. The operation of multiple wireless facilities in the same location over time may cause substantial adverse environmental impacts to aesthetics and safety by increasing the risk for fire hazards to the people and wildlife in the area and exposing sensitive species to RF/EMF radiation.

176. The Project is ineligible to be exempt from CEQA under sections 15301 and 15303 because categorical exemptions do not apply to any project that may cause a substantial adverse change in the significance of a historical resource. New towers and support structures may be installed on the grounds of properties listed or eligible for listing on the National, California, or County historic registers. Pursuant to the Ordinance, the County is not required to mandate an environmental assessment for facilities located on a site containing an eligible resource. New towers and support structures installed on the grounds of properties listed or eligible for listing on the National, California, or County historic registers may adversely impact historic resources. A project that may cause a substantial adverse change in the significance of an historical resource is a project that may have a significant effect on the environment. The Project may cause a substantial adverse change in the significance of a historical resource, and as a result may have a significant effect on the environment and is therefore ineligible to be exempt from CEQA under sections 15301 and 15303.

177. As a result of the foregoing defects, Respondent prejudicially abused their discretion by making determinations or adopting findings that do not comply with the requirements of CEQA and approving the Project in reliance thereon. Accordingly, Respondents' approval and exemption of the

Project from CEQA must be set aside.

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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(By Petitioners Against Respondents For Writ of Administrative Mandate Under CCP § 1094.5 and PRC § 21168 Or in the Alternative CCP § 1085 and PRC § 21168.5, Re: Violations of CEQA; Failure to Substantially Support Findings)

178. Petitioners hereby reallege and incorporate all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

179. Respondents violated CEQA in finding that the Ordinance was categorically exempted from CEQA environmental review under the Class 1 and Class 3 exemptions without substantial evidence.

180. Respondents found that the Ordinance was categorically exempted under the Class 1 and3 exemptions without providing substantial evidence in support of its determination.

181. Respondents failed to provide substantial evidence in finding that that the Ordinance could be categorically exempted from CEQA environmental review and similarly failed to provide substantial evidence that the Ordinance would not have a significant environmental impact due to unusual circumstances, cumulative impacts from successive projects of the same type in the same place, impact scenic resources, hazardous waste site or a historical resource without substantial evidence.

182. As a result of the foregoing defects, Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion by making determinations or adopting findings that do not comply with the requirements of CEQA and approving the Project in reliance thereon. Accordingly, Respondents' approval and exemption of the Project from CEQA must be set aside.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(By Petitioners Against Respondents For Writ of Administrative Mandate Under CCP § 1094.5 Or in the Alternative CCP § 1085, Re: Unlawful Colocation)

183. Petitioners hereby reallege and incorporate all the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

184. Government Code Sec. 65850.6(a) allows the colocation of a wireless facility to be a permitted use and not subject to discretionary permitting only if the conditions in 65850.6(a)(1) and (2) are met. Section 65850.6(a)(1) requires the colocation facility to comport with Section 65850.6(b). Section 65850.6(a)(2) and (b) require a certified environmental impact report, negative declaration, or mitigated negative declaration, or mitigation measures that conform to the same, pursuant to CEQA before permitting a collocated wireless facility.

185. SCFs and EFRs can involve "colocation facilities" as defined in 68550.6. Pursuant to section 16.25.030.A of the Ordinance, a permit application for SCFs and EFRs is complete if it demonstrates compliance with section 16.25 of the County Code. Section 16.25.030.B.7 *requires* the Commissioner to grant a permit when the Commissioner is satisfied that the SCF or EFR meets all applicable requirements for a permit under section 16.25 of the County Code. Authorizing the Commissioner to deem an application complete and thereafter grant a permit for a colocated wireless facility simply when the Commissioner determines that the application meets the applicable requirements under the above mentioned sections violates the necessary environmental compliance required by California Government Code section 65850.6 because it circumvents the determination of whether an EIR, negative declaration, or mitigated negative declaration was established on the colocated wireless facility. Because an environmental assessment is mandated by California Government Code section 65850.6, the Project cannot be exempted from CEQA.

186. Government Code section 65850.6(c) mandates notice pursuant to Government Code 65091 and "at least one public hearing on the discretionary permit" required by Section 65850.6(b) for wireless telecommunications colocation facilities. Ordinance section 22.140.760.D.1.a allows the installation and operation of small cell facilities that are located on private property to be approved through an alleged ministerial site plan review. However, Petitioners allege that the process is instead discretionary in nature for the reasons set forth in the Sixth Cause of Action herein. Because it is instead discretionary, the Ordinance therefore violates Government Code section 65850.6(c) for failing to provide a public hearing on the discretionary permit approval process.

187. As a result of the foregoing defects, Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion by requiring the Commissioner to deem an application complete and thereafter grant a permit for colocated wireless facilities without first complying with California Government Code section 65850.6. Accordingly, Respondents' approval and exemption of the Project from CEQA must be set aside.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(By Petitioners Against Respondents For Writ of Administrative Mandate Under CCP § 1094.5 Or in the Alternative CCP § 1085, Re: General Plan Inconsistency)

188. Petitioners hereby reallege and incorporate all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

189. Respondents committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion and failed to proceed in a manner required by law in approving this Project in that the Project is inconsistent with and frustrates

the County's principles and policies in the County's General Plan 2035 that are fundamental to the County. In particular, the Project is inconsistent with the following:

190. Guiding Principle 1: "Protect and conserve the County's natural and cultural resources, including the character of rural communities. In rural areas, land uses and developments that are compatible with the natural environment and landscape will maintain existing community character. These work in conjunction with other smart growth strategies to 'green' streets and buildings, and protect and conserve natural resources." Wireless facilities can be built up to 75 feet in height in industrial, rural, agricultural, open space, resort-recreation, and watershed zones. Temporary facilities may extend up to 200 feet in height for up to 6 months. There is no limitation on the amount or number of facilities that can be built within the same location, which can create a conglomerate or cluster of such facilities in a single area. There is no limitation on the amount or number of facilities that can be built in different locations. The development of such facilities poses a fire hazard that may significantly impact the conservation of natural resources. The construction and operation of such facilities will significantly impact the character of rural communities.

191. Policy C/NR 3.11: "Discourage development in riparian habitats, streambeds, wetlands, and other native woodlands in order to maintain and support their preservation in a natural state, unaltered by grading, fill, or diversion activities." Wireless facilities can be built up to 75 feet in height in industrial, rural, agricultural, open space, resort-recreation, and watershed zones. Temporary facilities may extend up to 200 feet in height for up to 6 months. There is no assessment of the cumulative impacts of wireless facilities in such locations, and the Ordinance provides no limitation on the amount or number of facilities that can be built within the same location, which can create a conglomerate or cluster of such facilities in a single area. The development of such facilities poses a fire hazard that may significantly impact the preservation of the natural state of such habitats. The construction and operation of such facilities will significantly impact the natural state of such resources.

192. Policy C/NR 13.1: "Protect scenic resources through land use regulations that mitigate development impacts." The Ordinance expressly contemplates that facilities will be placed in scenic rural areas, not just neighborhoods or the urban core. Wireless facilities can be built up to 75 feet in height in industrial, rural, agricultural, open space, resort-recreation, and watershed zones. Temporary facilities may extend up to 200 feet in height for up to 6 months. There is no limitation on the amount or number of facilities that can be built within the same location, which can create a conglomerate or cluster of such facilities in a single area. The construction and operation of such facilities will significantly impact the protection of scenic resources protected by the General Plan, and Respondents

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do not propose any identifiable mitigation measures to reduce such impact.

193. Policy C/NR 13.2: "Protect ridgelines from incompatible development that diminishes their scenic value." The Ordinance expressly contemplates that facilities will be placed in scenic rural areas, not just neighborhoods or the urban core. Wireless facilities can be built up to 75 feet in height in industrial, rural, agricultural, open space, resort-recreation, and watershed zones. Temporary facilities may extend up to 200 feet in height for up to 6 months. There is no limitation on the amount or number of facilities that can be built within the same location, which can create a conglomerate or cluster of such facilities in a single area. The construction and operation of such facilities will significantly diminish the scenic value of ridgelines protected by the General Plan.

194. Policy C/NR 14.1: "Mitigate all impacts from new development on or adjacent to historic, cultural, and paleontological resources to the greatest extent feasible." The Ordinance expressly allows facilities on, in or near to historical resources. The Ordinance does not contain any mitigation or protective measures against development on cultural or paleontological resources. There is no limitation on the amount or number of facilities that can be built within the same location, which can create a conglomerate or cluster of such facilities in a single area. The implementation of the Project frustrates the General Plan's protection of historic, cultural, and paleontological resources.

195. Policy C/NR 14.2: "Support an inter-jurisdictional collaborative system that protects and enhances historic, cultural, and paleontological resources." The Ordinance expressly allows facilities on, in or near historical resources. The Commissioner is provided sole discretion to grant permits and decide and the Director is provided with sole discretion to determine whether environmental assessments are necessary, with no third-party oversight on their decision-making process, thus frustrating the policy for an inter-jurisdictional collaborative system.

196. As a result of the foregoing defects, Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion by making determinations or adopting findings that do not comply with the requirements of California Government Code section 65860 and County Code sections 22.02.050 and 22.244.040.B.2. Accordingly, Respondents' approval of the Project must be set aside.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(By Petitioners Against Respondents For Writ of Administrative Mandate Under CCP § 1094.5 Or in the Alternative CCP § 1085, Re: County of Los Angeles Legislative Land Use & Zoning Process)

197. Petitioners hereby reallege and incorporate all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

198. The process by which the Project was approved by Respondents violates California

Government Code sections 65853, 65854, 65855 and 65857 as well as County Code sections 22.244.030 and 22.232.040.B.2.a.

199. Respondents violated California Government Code section 65853 because the amendments to Titles 16 and 22 of the County's Code of Ordinances were not adopted in the manner set forth in California Government Code sections 65854 to 65857.

200. Respondents violated California Government Code section 65854 because the planning commission failed to notice and hold a public hearing on the amendments to Title 16 of the County Code ("Title 16 Amendments").

201. Respondents violated California Government Code section 65855 because the planning commission failed to render a decision on Title 16 Amendments in the form of a written recommendation to the Board of Supervisors.

202. Respondents violated County Code section 22.244.030 because the Ordinance was not approved in a manner that complied with County Code section 22.232.

203. Respondents violated California Government Code section 65857 and County Code section 22.232.040.B.2.a because substantial revisions and amendments were made to the Ordinance *after* the Planning Commission recommended approval of the Ordinance to the Board of Supervisors. The Board of Supervisors failed to remand the revised and amended Ordinance to the Planning Commission for report and recommendation. On January 10, 2023, the Board of Supervisors approved the revised and amended Ordinance.

204. As a result of the foregoing defects, Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion by approving the Ordinance in manner that failed to comply with the requirements of California Government Code sections 65853, 65854, 65855 and 65857 as well as County Code sections 22.232.040.B.2.a and 22.244.030. Accordingly, Respondents' approval of the Project must be set aside.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(By Petitioners Against Respondents For Writ of Administrative Mandate Under CCP § 1094.5 or, in the Alternative, CCP § 1085, and Declaratory Relief Under CCP § 1060 Re: Improper and Prejudicial Blanket Designation of Permit Approval Process as Ministerial and Unlawful Precommitment to Future Approvals, Including Under CEQA)

205. Petitioners hereby reallege and incorporate all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

206. A ministerial decision describes a governmental decision involving little or no personal judgment by the public official as to the wisdom or manner of carrying out the project. CEQA Guidelines §15369. The public official merely applies the law to the facts as presented but uses no

special discretion or judgment in reaching a decision. *Id.* A ministerial decision involves only the use of fixed standards or objective measurements, and the public official cannot use personal, subjective judgment in deciding whether or how the project should be carried out. *Id.* Common examples of ministerial permits include automobile registrations, dog licenses, and marriage licenses. *Id.*

207. If the law requires an agency "to act on a project in a set way without allowing the agency to use its own judgment," the project is ministerial. CEQA Guidelines, §15002, subd. (i)(1).

208. Respondents erroneously label County Code sections 16.25.030.B.2, 16.25.030.B.3, 16.25.030.B.7, 16.25.050.C, 22.26.030.B.3, 22.140.760.D.1, 22.140.760.G.1 and 22.140.760.G.3 of the Ordinance as "ministerial" in violation of CEQA Guidelines sections 15369 and 15002, subd. (i)(1) because such sections necessitate the Commissioner's and/or Director's subjective judgment.

209. As an example, Section 16.25.030.B.2 of the Ordinance provides that the Commissioner may adopt and amend a design standards checklist and permit conditions, which includes public notification requirements, for SCFs and EFRs. This requires the Commissioner to exercise judgment and deliberate the substantive contents of the checklist and amend it in the Commissioner's sole discretion. The creation and amendment of the design standards checklist is not a process that is clearly prescribed and defined by the Board of Supervisors, and there is no clear standard for the Commissioner to follow in order to know when to amend said checklist, what contents should be amended, and what it should be amended to reflect. Because the Commissioner's subjective opinion is required in formulating and amending the checklist, it is discretionary in nature and is erroneously deemed a ministerial action.

210. Before permit issuance, Section 16.25.030.B.3 of the Ordinance requires the Commissioner's approval of engineered plans for SCFs that are to be mounted on new or replacement County infrastructure. The Ordinance fails to clearly prescribe and define how the Commissioner should proceed in approving such plans, what elements are required to be incorporated into such plans, or what elements should be omitted in an engineered plan before it is acceptable for approval by the Commissioner. Consequently, the Commissioner is required to use its subjective judgment to determine whether it approves or disapproves of a plan without any clear statutory guidance for how it should proceed in doing so. Because the Commissioner's subjective opinion is required in its approval or disapproval of engineered plans for SCFs that are to be mounted on new or replacement County infrastructure, it is discretionary in nature and is erroneously deemed a ministerial action.

211. Section 16.25.030.B.7 of the Ordinance requires that the Commissioner grant a permit when the Commissioner *is satisfied that* the SCF or EFR meets all applicable requirements for a permit.

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Section 16.08.040 (incorporated by reference through Section 16.25.030.B.6) provides that the Commissioner "may make such changes or additions in any application for a permit as in his opinion are necessary for the protection of the highways, for the prevention of undue interference with traffic, for the safety of persons using such highways, as to the route over which to move any over height, width, length or weight load; as to the location, depth, dimensions, character and number of excavations; as to encroachments made or placed; and as to other permits issued pursuant to this Division 1." Section 16.08.050 (also incorporated by reference through Section 16.25.030.B.6) provides that the Commissioner "may establish additional requirements for the work to be done under the permit, including equipment to be used, type of backfill, compaction, paving, traffic regulations, hours of work, flagmen, lights, inspection, and other similar requirements. He also may require whatever advance notice he deems proper for requests for inspection. The commissioner may add these requirements and conditions by rubber stamp or attachments to the permit, or both, and they shall be an integral part thereof." Section 16.08.080 states, in pertinent part, that "If the applicant complies with every applicable provision of this Division 1 and all applicable provisions of all other ordinances and statutes, the commissioner may issue to the applicant a written permit to perform the work set forth in the application. The commissioner may refuse to issue a permit if he finds that it is not in the best interest of the general public to do so." (emphasis added) The Ordinance grants great discretion to the Commissioner because a grant or denial of a permit is completely contingent upon the Commissioner's satisfaction, "opinion" or "finding." As a result, the Commissioner can arbitrarily grant or deny permits depending on its level of satisfaction or whatever its "opinion" may be. Because the Commissioner's subjective judgment is required in the grant or denial of permit, it is discretionary in nature and is erroneously deemed a ministerial action.

For any SCF that is requested to be placed on County infrastructure, Section 212. 16.25.050.C of the Ordinance requires that a structural analysis of the effect of such placement on the County infrastructure, including wind impacts on traffic signal poles and mast arms of traffic signals, must be provided for approval by the Commissioner, to ensure there is no overburden on County infrastructure. The Ordinance fails to clearly prescribe a guideline for the Commissioner to follow in approving a structural analysis to ensure that there is no overburden of County infrastructure. The Commissioner thus must use an exercise of subjective judgment and deliberation to determine whether it finds the structural analysis sufficient for approval. Because the Commissioner's subjective judgment is required in the approval or denial of a structural analysis during the permitting process, it is discretionary in nature and is erroneously deemed a ministerial action.

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213. Section 22.26.030.B.3 of the Ordinance provides that if a zone or land use category within a Specific Plan is silent with regard to wireless facilities, the Director *may* accept an application for a wireless facility if the Director determines that a wireless facility *is similar to* another use permitted within such zone of land use category. As a result, the Director is authorized with discretion in two ways: (i) in determining whether or not to accept an application, and (ii) determining whether the wireless facility is similar to another use permitted within such zone. Determining whether a wireless facility is similar to another permitted use necessarily requires a subjective determination and judgment because there is no objective framework or measure by which to ascertain whether one use is similar to another use. Once the Director determines if the wireless facility is similar to another permitted use, the Director then has the discretion to determine whether or not to accept an application. Because section 22.26.030.B.3 of the Ordinance necessitates the Director's subjective judgment, it provides the Director with discretionary authority and is consequently erroneously deemed a ministerial action.

214. Section 22.140.760.D.1 of the Ordinance provides that a Ministerial Site Plan Review application is required to authorize the installation and operation of a macro facility on an existing base station or tower that meets all standards in section 22.140.760.E of the Ordinance. Section 22.140.760.E of the Ordinance, however, provides that a historic resource assessment, "prepared to the satisfaction of the Director," may be required for a facility to be located on a site containing an eligible resource to identify impacts to historic resources, and identify mitigation to minimize impacts. This language confers upon the Director two differing levels of discretion: the first is that the Director may or may not compel a historic resource assessment; and the second is that if the Director does decide to compel a historic resource assessment, it must be prepared to the Director's satisfaction. This section of the Ordinance fails to provide an objective standard to guide the Director in its determinations for: (i) when a historic resource assessment must be compelled, and (ii) in what instances a historic resource assessment must be approved by the Director. As a result, the Director is required to use its subjective judgment to determine the instances in which it will compel and approve a historic resource assessment. In addition, conformance to sections 22.140.760.E.1.b.v and 22.140.760.E.1.e.i of the Ordinance also require the Director's discretion. Section 22.140.760.E.1.b.v states that the locating of new facilities must take into consideration the least aesthetically intrusive location. Because the Ordinance provides no objective standard for determining what might qualify for the least aesthetically intrusive location, the Director is left to its discretion to determine the same. Section 22.140.760.E.1.e.i states that all wireless facilities must be designed to "meet minimum standards for public safety" but

provides no objective measure for determining what the minimum standard for public safety is. As a result, the Director is left to its discretion to determine whether wireless facilities subject to this provision meet minimum standards for safety. Because section 22.140.760.D.1 of the Ordinance necessitates the Director's subjective judgment for the foregoing reasons, it provides the Director with discretionary authority and is consequently erroneously deemed a ministerial action.

215. Section 22.140.760.G.1 of the Ordinance provides that existing macro facilities may be eligible for a Ministerial Site Plan Review application if such facilities are redesigned with shorter mounting equipment that extends no more than two feet from the structure, or with removal of any existing mounting, and with additional screening techniques, such as shrouds or walls, that blend in with the structure, including color and texture, and conforms to all standards in section 22.140.760.E of the Ordinance, and does not require a waiver. Section 22.140.760.E of the Ordinance, however, provides that a historic resource assessment, "prepared to the satisfaction of the Director," may be required for a facility to be located on a site containing an eligible resource to identify impacts to historic resources, and identify mitigation to minimize impacts. This language confers upon the Director two differing levels of discretion: the first is that the Director may or may not compel a historic resource assessment; and the second is that if the Director does decide to compel a historic resource assessment, it must be prepared to the Director's satisfaction. This section of the Ordinance fails to provide an objective standard to guide the Director in its determinations for: (i) when a historic resource assessment must be compelled, and (ii) in what instances a historic resource assessment must be approved by the Director. As a result, the Director is required to use its subjective judgment to determine the instances in which it will compel and approve a historic resource assessment. In addition, conformance to sections 22.140.760.E.1.b.v and 22.140.760.E.1.e.i of the Ordinance also require the Director's discretion. Section 22.140.760.E.1.b.v states that the locating of new facilities must take into consideration the least aesthetically intrusive location. Because the Ordinance provides no objective standard for determining what might qualify for the least aesthetically intrusive location, the Director is left to its discretion to determine the same. Section 22.140.760.E.1.e.i states that all wireless facilities must be designed to "meet minimum standards for public safety" but provides no objective measure for determining what the minimum standard for public safety is. As a result, the Director is left to its discretion to determine whether wireless facilities subject to this provision meet minimum standards for safety. Because the Ordinance necessitates the Director's subjective judgment for the foregoing reasons, it provides the Director with discretionary authority and is consequently erroneously deemed a ministerial action.

216. Section 22.140.760.G.3 of the Ordinance states that an Eligible Facilities Request may be processed with a Ministerial Site Plan Review application if minor modifications will bring the facility in conformance with all standards in section 22.140.760.E of the Ordinance, and does not require a waiver. Section 22.140.760.E of the Ordinance, however, provides that a historic resource assessment, "prepared to the satisfaction of the Director," may be required for a facility to be located on a site containing an eligible resource to identify impacts to historic resources, and identify mitigation to minimize impacts. This language confers upon the Director two differing levels of discretion: the first is that the Director may or may not compel a historic resource assessment; and the second is that if the Director does decide to compel a historic resource assessment, it must be prepared to the Director's satisfaction. This section of the Ordinance fails to provide an objective standard to guide the Director in its determinations for: (i) when a historic resource assessment must be compelled, and (ii) in what instances a historic resource assessment must be approved by the Director. As a result, the Director is required to use its subjective judgment to determine the instances in which it will compel and approve a historic resource assessment. In addition, conformance to sections 22.140.760.E.1.b.v and 22.140.760.E.1.e.i of the Ordinance also require the Director's discretion. Section 22.140.760.E.1.b.v states that the locating of new facilities must take into consideration the least aesthetically intrusive location. Because the Ordinance provides no objective standard for determining what might qualify for the least aesthetically intrusive location, the Director is left to its discretion to determine the same. Section 22.140.760.E.1.e.i states that all wireless facilities must be designed to "meet minimum standards for public safety" but provides no objective measure for determining what the minimum standard for public safety is. As a result, the Director is left to its discretion to determine whether wireless facilities subject to this provision meet minimum standards for safety. Because the Ordinance necessitates the Director's subjective judgment for the foregoing reasons, it provides the Director with discretionary authority and is consequently erroneously deemed a ministerial action.

217. As a corollary, labeling of permit approvals as by-right or ministerial under the Ordinance violates CEQA's prohibition against precommitment, as the County will, by default, process each individual permit application enabled by the Ordinance as if it is by-right and ministerial (even though it is not in fact either by-right or ministerial) and will thereby not be obligated to conduct CEQA review for such individual permits for any potential significant impacts.

218. It is a "general principle that before conducting CEQA review, agencies must not 'take any action' that significantly furthers a project 'in a manner that forecloses alternatives or mitigation measures that would ordinarily be part of CEQA review of that public project." *Save Tara v. City of*

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West Hollywood (2008) 45 Cal.4th 116, 138 ("Save Tara"); CEQA Guidelines § 15004, subd.

(b)(2)(B). When deciding whether an agency precommitted or approved the project, courts "look both to the agreement itself and to the surrounding circumstances, as shown in the record of the decision, to determine whether an agency's authorization or execution of an agreement for development constitutes a "decision ... which commits the agency to a definite course of action in regard to a project." (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15352.)." *Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 116, 139.

219. Unlawful precommitment – or approval of the project before the review of its environmental impacts – may be found based on the totality of circumstances even where the final agreement includes a condition granting the county complete discretion over CEQA matters. *RiverWatch v. Olivenhain Municipal Water Dist.* (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1211–1212 (the agency's public announcements, actions, preparing to relocate tenants from the property, substantial financial contribution to the project, its willingness to bind itself, by the draft agreement, to convey the property if the developer 'satisfied' CEQA's 'requirements, as reasonably determined by the City Manager,' all demonstrate that "City committed itself to a definite course of action regarding the project before fully evaluating its environmental effects. That is what sections 21100 and 21151 prohibit.")

220. Labeling of permit-issuance as by-right or ministerial under the Ordinance further violated CEQA in that such designation will effectively foreclose the County's power to shape any individual projects or to require mitigation of any potential significant impacts from the placement, modification, or colocation of wireless facilities. As noted in an analogous context of approving redevelopment plans with various individual development projects therein, "This statement in the EIR thus offers no guarantee that potential significant impacts reasonably foreseeable now will be analyzed prior to actual development." *Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 511, 536 ("*Friends of Mammoth*").

221. It is reasonably foreseeable that individual permits and projects enabled or regulated by the Ordinance may have significant individual and cumulative environmental impacts, including during their construction and operations phases. "If the proposed activity is the sort that is capable of causing direct or reasonably foreseeable indirect effects on the environment, some type of environmental review is justified, and the activity must be deemed a project. CEQA analysis is then undertaken to evaluate the likelihood and nature of the project's environmental impacts, in order to determine the extent of environmental review required." *Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1197-1198.

222. "CEQA requires an EIR only for projects whose environmental effect can be described 1 as 'significant.' This key word, however, is not a term of precision but encompasses a range of 2 meaning.¹⁶ It cannot be adequately defined by a random selection of synonyms from a thesaurus. 3 Facing a spectrum of possible meanings, describing a range extending from projects of relatively minor 4 import to those of truly momentous proportions, the court's task is to indicate the point on this spectrum 5 beyond which the seriousness of the foreseeable impact dictates preparation of an EIR." No Oil, Inc. v. 6 City of Los Angeles (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68, 82-83 ("No Oil"). Footnote 16 in No Oil, supra, further provides that significant in CEQA covers a "spectrum ranging from 'not trivial' through 'appreciable' 7" and "reasonably foreseeable" covers "a range of meaning" "extending from the most unlikely 8 possibility...." No Oil, 13 Cal.3d at 83 & fn. 16. 9 CEQA does not expressly exempt development or policies or ordinances or design 223. checklists. CEQA Guidelines § 15061(b). To the contrary, CEQA Guidelines § 15111 specifically

provides for CEQA review for permit-applications under any enabling legislation or ordinances where the related enabling ordinances provide for short review periods. The Ordinance here is such an enabling ordinance and, as a result, must provide for CEQA review of permits it enables. Yet, to the contrary, the Ordinance specifically designates permit-issuance as ministerial to avoid CEQA review.

224. As a result of the foregoing, Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion by unlawfully designating sections 22.26.030.B.3, 22.140.760.D.1, 22.140.760.G.1 and 22.140.760.G.3 of the Ordinance as "ministerial" in violation of CEQA Guidelines sections 15369 and 15002, subd. (i)(1) because such sections necessitate the Director's subjective judgment, as well as in violation of CEQA's prohibition of precommitment to an approval of any individual permits enabled by the Ordinance without further CEQA review.

225. Similarly, by improperly designating permit approvals of wireless facilities as ministerial actions under the Ordinance, Respondents blanketly and prejudicially deprived the public of the right to be apprised of any actions or approvals enabled by the Ordinance or contest such actions unless they can be proven to be arbitrary and capricious, thus also significantly increasing the burden of proof to bring such challenges. (See, *California Assn. of Medical Products Suppliers v. Maxwell-Jolly* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 286, 302-303 [in reviewing a challenge under "Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, a trial court's role generally is to "determine whether the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or without evidentiary support, and/or whether it failed to conform to the law…"].)

226. "[A] project is ministerial 'when a private party can legally compel approval without any changes in the design of its project which might alleviate adverse environmental consequences."

(Friends of Westwood, at p. 267, 235 Cal.Rptr. 788.) "The statutory distinction between discretionary and purely ministerial projects implicitly recognizes that unless a public agency [is authorized to] shape the project in a way that would respond to concerns raised in an EIR, or its functional equivalent, environmental review would be a meaningless exercise." (Mountain Lion, at p. 117, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 580, 939 P.2d 1280.)" *Protecting Our Water and Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus* (2020) 10 Cal.5th 479, 493–494. As held in *Protecting Our Water, supra*, based on the facts of *this* case as well, "[P]laintiffs are entitled to a declaration that County's blanket ministerial categorization is unlawful." *Id.* at 501-502. The County's blanket designation of most permit approvals as ministerial will prejudicially deprive Petitioners and the public of their due process rights (notice, hearing) and environmental protection rights. Such blanket designation will also significantly increase Petitioners' burden to successfully challenge any arbitrary actions by the County or its individual decisionmakers with respect to permit approvals or respective procedures.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(By Petitioners Against Respondents For Writ of Administrative Mandate Under CCP § 1094.5 and PRC § 21168 or in the Alternative, CCP § 1085 and PRC § 21168.5; and Declaratory Relief Under CCP § 1060, Re: Constitutional Due Process Violations)

227. Petitioners hereby reallege and incorporate all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

228. A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Cal. Const. art. I, § 7. Due process requires that deprivation of property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing. Due process principles require reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard before governmental deprivation of a significant property interest. *Horn v. Cnty. of Ventura* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 612, citing *North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.* (1975) 419 U.S. 601, 605-606; *Goss v. Lopez* (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 572-576; *Board of Regents v. Roth* (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 576-577; *Boddie v. Connecticut* (1971) 401 U.S. 371, 379; *Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.* (1969) 395 U.S. 337, 339; *Skelly v. State Personnel Bd.* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 206-207; *Beaudreau v. Superior Court* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458; *Randone v. Appellate Department* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536, 541. Land use decisions which "substantially affect" the property rights of owners of adjacent parcels may constitute "deprivations" of property within the context of procedural due process.

229. Under any possible circumstances, the Ordinance is unconstitutional, including for its vagueness, overbreadth, and failure to ensure procedural due process, including notice and fair hearing for property owners, in processing permit applications and related approvals. The Ordinance enables

arbitrary quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicatory actions by non-elected individuals, without any oversight, due process, or procedure to contest such actions.

230. As an example, wireless facilities will be permitted immediately next to individual residents' property, and this will have a significant effect on, and lead to a substantial loss of property rights and property value for those properties adjacent to the wireless facilities. The Ordinance, however, does not provide any notice or any opportunity for hearing. As a result of the foregoing defect, Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion by approving the Ordinance without providing property owners with a hearing and opportunity to be heard in violation of due process rights. Accordingly, Respondents' approval of the Project must be set aside.

231. Similarly, the Ordinance allows a Commissioner or Planning Director to develop or modify design checklist to adjudicate permit-applications, and provides for no due process for the public to review and shape such design checklist. As such, the Ordinance allows for completely arbitrary actions by individual staff members without any possibility for the public to be notified about such developed design checklists or proposed amendments thereto, and public review and scrutiny of the same.

232. Placement of telecommunication devices near individual properties may or will affect and interfere with individual property rights, including but not limited to unimpeded use of property.

233. Similarly, the Ordinance is overbroad as it blanketly allows most, if not all, permit applications to be treated and processed as ministerial or by-right even though the Ordinance also retains considerable discretion for the individual decisionmakers and requires extensive subjective judgment. As such, Petitioner will be deprived of due process, including adequate public notice and an opportunity to be heard, before their statutory CEQA rights and property rights may be harmed by the County's by-right or ministerial adjudication of individual permits enabled by the Ordinance. Petitioners are denied the ability to obtain a hearing and seek the exercise of discretion that lessens the negative impact on them, and they cannot exhort the Commissioner or Planning Director to make subjective judgments or findings in their favor even though the Ordinance confers discretion and subjectivity. *See, e.g., Horn v. County of Ventura* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 616-619; *Scott v. City of Indian Wells* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 541, 548-550.

234. The Ordinance fails to provide guarantees and safeguards to guard against arbitrary actions by the County, including by the Commissioner or Planning Director in devising or amending design checklists or adjudicating individual applications. It precludes adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity for hearing, especially for those actions wrongly deemed as "ministerial" rather than discretionary. Under the Ordinance, the affected nearby property owners are denied any ability to be timely apprised of and to argue that the Commissioner or Planning Director should exercise the discretion the Ordinance confers and either deny an SCF application or require changes to a proposed SCF or EFR. This violates procedural due process required by both legislation and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See *Mathews v. Eldridge* (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333 (essence of due process is notice and the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner).

235. "[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural." *Mathews v. Eldridge* (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 335 (*"Mathews"*).

236. Based on the three factors in *Mathews*, the private interest that will be affected by the Ordinance or its enabled permit approvals is significant, involving both deprivation of property rights and also significant risks to human life and health. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioners' private interests is also significant since Petitioners will have neither notice nor opportunity to be heard before any permits are approved near their properties. And the Government's interest, including the function involved and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail are not significant to provide adequate notice and an opportunity for a public review to the public. In addition, such notice and opportunity for public review is mandated by various state laws, including CEQA, California Planning and Zoning Law, and environmental justice principles at issue.

237. As a direct result of such procedural due process violations, Petitioners who represent disadvantaged low-income communities that will be affected by the Ordinance will also be subject to disparate impact and violations of environmental justice principles for being unable to raise any environmental justice concerns about any arbitrary actions by individual decisionmakers. " 'So-called "substantive due process" prevents the government from engaging in conduct that "shocks the conscience," [citation], or interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' [citation].' (*United States v. Salerno* (1987) 481 U.S. 739, 746 [95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 107 S. Ct. 2095] [quoting *Rochin v. California* (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 172 [96 L. Ed. 183, 72 S. Ct. 205], and *Palko v. Connecticut* (1937) 302 U.S. 319, 325–326 [82 L. Ed. 288, 58 S. Ct. 149], respectively].) As observed by the high court, 'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended' (*Collins v. Harker Heights* (1992) 503 U.S. 115, 125 [117 L. Ed. 2d 261, 112 S. Ct. 1061])." *Cook v. City of*

Buena Park (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(By Petitioners Against Respondents For Writ of Administrative Mandate Under CCP § 1094.5 Or in the Alternative CCP § 1085, and Declaratory Relief Under CCP § 1060 Re: Unlawful Delegation of Legislative Authority to an Administrative Agency)

238. Petitioners hereby reallege and incorporate all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

239. The Project improperly delegates the Board of Supervisors' legislative authority to the Commissioner and the Director of Planning, including under CEQA.

240. Legislative bodies have limited authority to delegate their legislative powers to administrative bodies and must provide ascertainable standards and safeguards. *State Board of Dry Cleaners* v. *Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc.* (1953) 40 Cal.2d 436, 448; *Kugler, supra,* 69 Cal.2d at 375-377; *Stoddard v. Edelman* (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 544, 548.

241. In delegating the elected decisionmaker Board of Supervisors' authority to the nonelected Commissioner, the Project fails to establish a mechanism to assure the proper implementation of the Board of Supervisors' policy decisions and an ascertainable standard to guide the Commissioner in: (i) developing, adopting, and/or amending the design standards checklist for small cell facilities and eligible facilities requests pursuant to section 16.25.030.B.2 of the Ordinance; (ii) approving an applicant's engineered plans for small cell facilities that are to be mounted on new or county infrastructure pursuant to section 16.25.030.B.3 of the Ordinance; (iii) granting permits when the Commissioner "is satisfied" that the applicable requirements for a permit are met for small cell facilities or eligible facilities requests pursuant to section 16.25.030.B.7 of the Ordinance; (iv) the criteria for deciding or finding when an application should be denied or required changes should be made; and (v) approving an applicant's structural analysis of the effect of placement of small cell facilities on county infrastructure pursuant to section 16.25.050.C of the Ordinance.

242. In delegating the Board of Supervisors' authority to the Director of Planning, the Project fails to establish a mechanism to assure the proper implementation of the Board of Supervisors' policy decisions and an ascertainable standard to guide the Director of Planning in: (i) modifying the Land Use Application Checklist – Small Cell Facilities, Collocation And Eligible Facilities Requests, and the Zoning Permit Instructions and Checklist pursuant to section 22.140.760.D.4 of the Ordinance; and (ii) determining whether a historic resource assessment is required and in what instances to approve the same for facilities to be located on a site containing a resource eligible for listing on the National, California, or County historic registers.

243. The Commissioner and Director are delegated the task of devising said checklists, and fleshing out substantive requirements, including, but not limited to, the liability insurance and public notification requirements. The Project confers on the Commissioner and Director the discretionary task of developing and then, on an as-needed basis, unilaterally modifying checklists that impose substantive requirements that will then be applied to individual permit applications. The new checklist related tasks delegate legislative and policy determinations to the Commissioner and Director, as the Commissioner and Director are free to create new substantive obligations by taking legislative and discretionary action. The Ordinance does not provide any direction in guiding the Commissioner or Director's discretion regarding these substantive and subjective legislative-type decisions. Applicants must abide by said checklists, and there is no procedure by which the public can appeal the implementation, or any modifications to, said checklists.

244. The Commissioner's developed design checklist or amendment thereof may have direct or reasonably foreseeable indirect significant impacts as such design may enable adjudication of various individual permits or modification requests as ministerial or by-right and hence exempt from CEQA, whereas such permits or modifications may have the capability to cause significant impacts. And yet, under the Ordinance, by virtue of allowing the Commissioner to unilaterally develop or modify design checklists, the Ordinance enables the Commissioner to do so without any CEQA review and resultant public participation and review safeguards.

245. As such, the aforesaid delegation of the power to develop or modify the design checklist for adjudication of permit or modification applications will violate the non-delegation provisions and related due process safeguards under CEQA, other state statutes governing land use permitting and the California Constitution. Specifically, under CEQA Guidelines § 15025(a), CEQA allows the public agency's delegation of specific functions to the staff, where such functions include determinations of whether the project (here, development or modification of a design checklist) is exempt from CEQA. However, subdivision (b) of section 15025 specifically precludes delegation for an approval of an EIR or mitigated negative declaration.

246. In addition, even though CEQA Guidelines § 15025(a)(1) allows staff determinations of whether the project is exempt from CEQA, CEQA Guidelines § 15061(e) requires that such exemption determinations be appealable to the elected decisionmakers.

247. Further, CEQA defines an approval broadly to include any action by the public agency that may directly or indirectly cause environmental impacts and mandates review of the project's potential impacts *before* such approval. CEQA Guidelines §§ 15352 & 15004. Similarly, CEQA

defines a project broadly to include any action that *may* have significant impacts. CEQA Guidelines § 15387(a).

248. CEQA does not expressly exempt development or policies or ordinances or design checklists. CEQA Guidelines § 15061(b). To the contrary, CEQA Guidelines § 15111 specifically provides for CEQA review for permit-applications under any enabling legislation or ordinances where the related enabling ordinances provide for short review periods. The Ordinance here is such an enabling ordinance and, as a result, must provide for CEQA review of permits it enables. Yet, to the contrary, the Ordinance specifically designates permit-issuance as ministerial to avoid CEQA review.

249. Under CEQA's broad definition of a project and approval, development or amendment of a design checklist by the Commissioner qualifies as both a project and approval. Hence, it must be subject to CEQA and require CEQA determination. To the extent such CEQA determination may be an EIR or Mitigated Negative declaration, it may not be delegated to the Commissioner under CEQA Guidelines § 15025(b). To the extent such CEQA determination is an exemption, that determination must be still reviewable by and appealed to the Board of Supervisors under CEQA Guidelines § 15061(e). However, the Ordinance's unconditional delegation of the function of developing design checklists to the Commissioner without providing for any CEQA review of the same or ensuring that such action and related CEQA determinations be reviewed by the elected decisionmaking body violates CEQA's non-delegation and CEQA appeal provisions.

250. As a result of the foregoing defects, Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion by unlawfully delegating legislative authority of developing or amending design checklists to the Commissioner and Director without any due process safeguards, including under CEQA but also under controlling state law land use requirements. Accordingly, Respondents' approval of the Project must be set aside.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioners pray for judgment and relief as set forth below:

A. For a Writ of Mandate commanding Respondents to vacate any purported approvals of the Project, and to require Respondents to complete CEQA environmental review and to ensure public notice, review, comment, and participation as required by law, including but not limited to California and U.S. Constitutions, Planning and Zoning Law, and the County Code;

B. For a temporary stay, temporary restraining order, and preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Respondents and Real Parties in Interest, and their agents, employees, officers or representatives, and all persons acting in concert or participating with Real Parties in Interest from

taking any action to implement the Project, unless and until Respondents fully comply with CEQA, including PRC section 21168.5; California Government Code sections 65860, 65853, 65854, 65855, and 65857; County Code sections 22.244.030, 22.244.040 and 22.02.050, Constitutional Due Process, and all other applicable state law;

C. For a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties hereto, including but not limited to a declaratory judgment that Respondents violated their duties pursuant to CEQA, including under PRC section 21168.5; California Government Code sections, including 65860, 65853, 65854, 65855, and 65857; County Code sections 22.244.030, 22.244.040 and 22.02.050; California and U.S. Constitutions; and all other applicable state laws, and that the Ordinance approvals and CEQA exemption determinations are null and void and without legal effect;

D. For a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties hereto, including declaratory judgment that Respondents' blanket designation of permit approvals as ministerial or by-right under the Ordinance was improper and also prejudicially foreclosed future CEQA review in violation of CEQA;

E. For a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties hereto, including declaratory judgment that Respondents' delegation of the power to formulate and amend the design checklists to adjudicate permit-applications for personal wireless telecommunication facilities violated the non-delegation requirements, including under CEQA and California Constitution;

F.

For such other relief as this Court deems appropriate and just.

DATED: November 2, 2023

MITCHELL M. TSAI LAW FIRM

By:

MITCHELL M. TSAI NAIRA SOGHBATYAN REZA A. MOHAMADZADEH

Attorneys for Petitioners and Plaintiffs FIBER FIRST LOS ANGELES, *et al.*

I, Douglas Wood, am Coordinator of 5G Free California, a Petitioner and Plaintiff in this action. I am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have read the foregoing VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED PETITION and know its contents. The facts alleged therein are within my own knowledge and I know these facts to be true, except as stated, on information and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on October 25, 2023, at Port Washington, New York.

Douglas A. Wood

I, Vivian M. Escalante, am the President and Chief Executive Officer of Boyle Heights Community Partners, a Petitioner and Plaintiff in this action. I am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have read the foregoing VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED PETITION and know its contents. The facts alleged therein are within my own knowledge and I know these facts to be true, except as stated, on information and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on November 2, 2023, in Los Angeles, California.

Vivian Escalante

I, Reza Mohamadzadeh, am the attorney of record for California Fires & Firefighters, a Petitioner and Plaintiff in this action. The representative of California Fires & Firefighters is absent from the County of Los Angeles at this time. I am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have prepared and read the foregoing VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED PETITION and know its contents. The facts alleged therein are within my own knowledge and I know these facts to be true, except as stated, on information and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.



I, Jodi Nelson am Director of Californians for Safe Technology, a Petitioner and Plaintiff in this action. I am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have read the foregoing VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED PETITION and know its contents. The facts alleged therein are within my own knowledge and I know these facts to be true, except as stated, on information and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on November 2, 2023, at Dahlonega, GA

bdi Nelson

Jodi Nelson

I, May Holland am beauch Cranch of Children's Health Defense, a Petitioner and Plaintiff in this action. I am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have read the foregoing VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF and know its contents. The facts alleged therein are within my own knowledge and I know these facts to be true, except as stated, on information and belief. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on _2____ November 2023, at the part Kilig New York Ma signif VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND COMPLAINT

I, Reza Mohamadzadeh, am the attorney of record for EMF Safety Network, a Petitioner and Plaintiff in this action. The representative of EMF Safety Network is absent from the County of Los Angeles at this time. I am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have prepared and read the foregoing VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED PETITION and know its contents. The facts alleged therein are within my own knowledge and I know these facts to be true, except as stated, on information and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.



I, Douglas Wood, am Coordinator of Fiber First Los Angeles, a Petitioner and Plaintiff in this action. I am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have read the foregoing VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED PETITION and know its contents. The facts alleged therein are within my own knowledge and I know these facts to be true, except as stated, on information and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on November 2, 2023, at Port Washington, New York.

Douglas A. Wood

I, Reza Mohamadzadeh, am the attorney of record for Malibu for Safe Tech, a Petitioner and Plaintiff in this action. The representative of Malibu for Safe Tech is absent from the County of Los Angeles at this time. I am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have prepared and read the foregoing VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED PETITION and know its contents. The facts alleged therein are within my own knowledge and I know these facts to be true, except as stated, on information and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.



I, Reza Mohamadzadeh, am the attorney of record for Mothers of East LA, a Petitioner and Plaintiff in this action. The representative of Mothers of East LA is absent from the County of Los Angeles at this time. I am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have prepared and read the foregoing VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED PETITION and know its contents. The facts alleged therein are within my own knowledge and I know these facts to be true, except as stated, on information and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.



I, Reza Mohamadzadeh, am the attorney of record for Union Binacional de Organizaciones de Trabajadores Mecicanos Exbraceros 1942-1964, a Petitioner and Plaintiff in this action. The representative of Union Binacional de Organizaciones de Trabajadores Mecicanos Exbraceros 1942-1964 is absent from the County of Los Angeles at this time. I am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have prepared and read the foregoing VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED PETITION and know its contents. The facts alleged therein are within my own knowledge and I know these facts to be true, except as stated, on information and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

I, <u>Klint A. Cowan</u> , am <u>the Attorney General</u> of the United Keetoowah Band of
Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma, a Petitioner and Plaintiff in this action. I am authorized to make this
verification on its behalf. I have read the foregoing VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED PETITION and
know its contents. The facts alleged therein are within my own knowledge and I know these facts to be
true, except as stated, on information and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on November 2, 2023, at <u>Oklahoma City</u>, Oklahoma.

EXHIBIT A



VIA ELECTRONIC & U.S. MAIL

January 20, 2023

Celia Zavala, Executive Officer	Bruce Durbin
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors	Supervising Regional Planner
Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration	Department of Regional Planning
500 West Temple Street, Room 383	320 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012	Los Angeles, CA 90012
Em: <u>executiveoffice@bos.lacounty.gov</u>	Em: <u>ordinance@planning.lacounty.gov</u>
Supervisor Hilda Solis, District 1	Supervisor Holly J. Michell, District 2
Los Angeles County Board of	Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors	Supervisors
Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration	Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
500 West Temple Street, Room 856	500 West Temple Street, Room 866
Los Angeles, CA 90012	Los Angeles, CA 90012
Em: <u>firstdistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u>	Em: HollyJMitchell@bos.lacounty.gov
Supervisor Lindsey P. Horvath, District 3	Supervisor Janice Hahn, District 4
Supervisor Lindsey P. Horvath, District 3 Los Angeles County Board of	Supervisor Janice Hahn, District 4 Los Angeles County Board of
Los Angeles County Board of	Los Angeles County Board of
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821 Los Angeles, CA 90012	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822 Los Angeles, CA 90012
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>ThirdDistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u>	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822 Los Angeles, CA 90012
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>ThirdDistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u> Supervisor Kathryn Barger, District 5	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822 Los Angeles, CA 90012
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>ThirdDistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u> Supervisor Kathryn Barger, District 5 Los Angeles County Board of	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822 Los Angeles, CA 90012
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>ThirdDistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u> Supervisor Kathryn Barger, District 5 Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822 Los Angeles, CA 90012

Em: Kathryn@bos.lacounty.gov

County of Los Angeles – Wireless Facilities Ordinance January 20, 2023 Page 2 of 5

RE: <u>Notice of Intent to File Suit Under the California Environmental Quality</u> <u>Act</u>

Dear Sirs/Madams:

I am writing on behalf of the following parties:

- 1) Fiber First Los Angeles;
- 2) Mothers of East LA;
- 3) Union Binacional de Organizaciones de Trabajadores Mexicanos Exbraceros 1942-1964;
- 4) Boyle Heights Community Partners;
- 5) California Fires & Firefighters;
- 6) Malibu for Safe Tech;
- 7) EMF Safety Network;
- 8) Californians for Safe Technology;
- 9) 5G Free California; and
- 10) Children's Health Defense.

The above parties are a collection of public interest organizations and Los Angeles County residents (collectively "**Petitioners**"). On behalf of Petitioners, this office is contacting you regarding the County of Los Angeles' ("**Respondent**") action on January 10, 2023 and all subsequent actions approving the ordinance amending Title 16 – Highways and Title 22 – Planning and Zoning of the Los Angeles County Code, including any revisions and/or amendments thereto (hereinafter "**Project**").

Please take notice, pursuant to Public Resources Code ("**PRC**") § 21167.5, that Petitioners intend to file a Verified Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("**Petition**"), under the provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act ("**CEQA**"), PRC §§ 21000, *et seq.*, against Respondent challenging the unlawful actions taken by Respondent in approving the Project. Petitioner may also file the Petition for violations of other state and/or local laws. The Petition being filed will seek the following relief:

- A. For a writ of mandate commanding Respondent to vacate and withdraw the approval of the Project, and to require Respondent to comply with CEQA;
- B. For a temporary stay, temporary restraining order, and preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Respondent, and its agents, employees, officers and/or representatives, from taking any action to implement the Project, unless and until Respondent fully complies with CEQA;
- C. For a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties hereto, including but not limited to a declaratory judgment that Respondent violated its duty pursuant to CEQA;
- D. For Petitioners' fees and costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, as authorized by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 and any other applicable provisions of law; and
- E. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and just.

Sincerely,

Mitchell M. Tsai Attorneys for Petitioners

County of Los Angeles – Wireless Facilities Ordinance January 20, 2023 Page 4 of 5

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Steven Thong, declare as follows:

I am a resident of the State of California and am over the age of 18 years. My business address is: 139 South Hudson Avenue, Ste. 200, Pasadena, California 91101. On January 20, 2023, I served a copy of the foregoing document(s) entitled:

Notice of Intent to File Suit Under the California Environmental Quality Act

on the following parties:

Celia Zavala, Executive Officer Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 383 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>executiveoffice@bos.lacounty.gov</u>

Supervisor Hilda Solis, District 1 Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 856 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>firstdistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u>

Supervisor Lindsey P. Horvath, District 3 Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>ThirdDistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u>

Supervisor Kathryn Barger, District 5 Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 869 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>Kathryn@bos.lacounty.gov</u> Bruce Durbin Supervising Regional Planner Department of Regional Planning 320 West Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: ordinance@planning.lacounty.gov

Supervisor Holly J. Michell, District 2 Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 866 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>Holly[Mitchell@bos.lacounty.gov</u>

Supervisor Janice Hahn, District 4 Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>FourthDistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u> County of Los Angeles – Wireless Facilities Ordinance January 20, 2023 Page 5 of 5

- X by depositing a true and correct copy in a sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with postage fully prepaid; and
- X by electronic service, via electronic transmission, to the email addresses specified above.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 20, 2023 in Los Angeles, California.

Steven Thong



VIA ELECTRONIC & U.S. MAIL

March 7, 2023

Celia Zavala, Executive Officer	Bruce Durbin
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors	Supervising Regional Planner
Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration	Department of Regional Planning
500 West Temple Street, Room 383	320 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012	Los Angeles, CA 90012
Em: <u>executiveoffice@bos.lacounty.gov</u>	Em: <u>ordinance@planning.lacounty.gov</u>
Supervisor Hilda Solis, District 1	Supervisor Holly J. Michell, District 2
Los Angeles County Board of	Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors	Supervisors
Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration	Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
500 West Temple Street, Room 856	500 West Temple Street, Room 866
Los Angeles, CA 90012	Los Angeles, CA 90012
Em: <u>firstdistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u>	Em: HollyJMitchell@bos.lacounty.gov
Supervisor Lindsey P. Horvath, District 3	Supervisor Janice Hahn, District 4
Supervisor Lindsey P. Horvath, District 3 Los Angeles County Board of	Supervisor Janice Hahn, District 4 Los Angeles County Board of
Los Angeles County Board of	Los Angeles County Board of
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821 Los Angeles, CA 90012	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822 Los Angeles, CA 90012
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>ThirdDistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u>	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822 Los Angeles, CA 90012
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>ThirdDistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u> Supervisor Kathryn Barger, District 5	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822 Los Angeles, CA 90012
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>ThirdDistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u> Supervisor Kathryn Barger, District 5 Los Angeles County Board of	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822 Los Angeles, CA 90012
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>ThirdDistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u> Supervisor Kathryn Barger, District 5 Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors	Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822 Los Angeles, CA 90012

Em: <u>Kathryn@bos.lacounty.gov</u>

County of Los Angeles – Wireless Facilities Ordinance March 7, 2023 Page 2 of 5

RE: <u>Notice of Intent to File Suit Under the California Environmental Quality</u> <u>Act</u>

Dear Sirs/Madams:

I am writing on behalf of United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma.

The above party is a public interest organization and Los Angeles County residents (hereinafter "**Petitioner**"). On behalf of Petitioner, this office is contacting you regarding the County of Los Angeles' ("**Respondent**") action on January 10, 2023 and all subsequent actions approving the ordinance amending Title 16 – Highways and Title 22 – Planning and Zoning of the Los Angeles County Code, including any revisions and/or amendments thereto (hereinafter "**Project**").

Please take notice, pursuant to Public Resources Code ("**PRC**") § 21167.5, that Petitioner intend to file a Verified Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("**Petition**"), under the provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act ("**CEQA**"), PRC §§ 21000, *et seq.*, against Respondent challenging the unlawful actions taken by Respondent in approving the Project. Petitioner may also file the Petition for violations of other state and/or local laws.

The Petition being filed will seek the following relief:

- A. For a writ of mandate commanding Respondent to vacate and withdraw the approval of the Project, and to require Respondent to comply with CEQA;
- B. For a temporary stay, temporary restraining order, and preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Respondent, and its agents, employees, officers and/or representatives, from taking any action to implement the Project, unless and until Respondent fully complies with CEQA;
- C. For a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties hereto, including but not limited to a declaratory judgment that Respondent violated its duty pursuant to CEQA;

County of Los Angeles – Wireless Facilities Ordinance March 7, 2023 Page 3 of 5

- D. For Petitioner's fees and costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, as authorized by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 and any other applicable provisions of law; and
- E. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and just.

Sincerely,

Mitchell M. Tsai Attorneys for Petitioners

County of Los Angeles – Wireless Facilities Ordinance March 7, 2023 Page 4 of 5

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Jonathan Montano, declare as follows:

I am a resident of the State of California and am over the age of 18 years. My business address is: 139 South Hudson Avenue, Ste. 200, Pasadena, California 91101. On March 7, 2023, I served a copy of the foregoing document(s) entitled:

Notice of Intent to File Suit Under the California Environmental Quality Act

on the following parties:

Celia Zavala, Executive Officer Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 383 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>executiveoffice@bos.lacounty.gov</u>

Supervisor Hilda Solis, District 1 Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 856 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>firstdistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u>

Supervisor Lindsey P. Horvath, District 3 Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 821 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>ThirdDistrict@bos.lacounty.gov</u>

Supervisor Kathryn Barger, District 5 Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 869 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>Kathryn@bos.lacounty.gov</u> Bruce Durbin Supervising Regional Planner Department of Regional Planning 320 West Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>ordinance@planning.lacounty.gov</u>

Supervisor Holly J. Michell, District 2 Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 866 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: <u>Holly[Mitchell@bos.lacounty.gov</u>

Supervisor Janice Hahn, District 4 Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street, Room 822 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Em: FourthDistrict@bos.lacounty.gov County of Los Angeles – Wireless Facilities Ordinance March 7, 2023 Page 5 of 5

- X by depositing a true and correct copy in a sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with postage fully prepaid; and
- <u>X</u> by electronic service, via electronic transmission, to the email addresses specified above.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 7, 2023 in Los Angeles, California.

/s/ Jonathan Montano

Jonathan Montano

EXHIBIT B

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Mitchell M. Tsai (Cal. Bar No. 277156) Armita A. Ariano (Cal Bar No. 314434) Mitchell M. Tsai, Attorney at Law 139 South Hudson Avenue, Suite 200 Pasadena, California 91101 V: (626) 314-3821, F: (626) 389-5414 E: <u>mitch@mitchtsailaw.com</u> E: <u>armita@mitchtsailaw.com</u> E: <u>info@mitchtsailaw.com</u> Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Petitioners Fiber First L Angeles <i>et al</i> (Additional counsel on following page SUPERIOR COURT OF TE	
10	FOR THE COUNTY	Y OF LOS ANGELES
11	FIBER FIRST LOS ANGELES; MOTHERS) CASE NO.:
12	OF EAST LA; UNION BINACIONAL DE)
13	ORGANIZACIONES DE TRABAJADORES MEXICANOS EXBRACEROS 1942-1964;) ELECTION REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
14	BOYLE HEIGHTS COMMUNITY PARTNERS; UNITED KEETOOWAH BAND) California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub
15	OF CHEROKEE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA;) Res. Code § 21000 et seq; Planning & Zoning
16	CALIFORNIA FIRES & FIREFIGHTERS; MALIBU FOR SAFE TECH; EMF SAFETY) Law, Cal. Government Code 65000 <i>et seq</i>;) County Code §§ 22.02.050, 22.232.040,
17	NETWORK; CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFE) 22.244.030, and 22.244.040; Cal. Const. art. I, §
18	TECHNOLOGY; 5G FREE CALIFORNIA; and CHILDREN'S HEALTH DEFENSE,) 7; Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1085, 1094.5
19	Plaintiffs and Petitioners,) Dep't:
20	v.)
21	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; COUNTY OF)
22	LOS ANGELES BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES REGIONAL)
23	PLANNING COMMISSION; COUNTY OF)
24	LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF REGIONAL PLANNING; COUNTY OF LOS)
25	ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS; and DOES 1–10, inclusive;)
26)
27	Defendants, Respondents, and Real Parties in Interest)
27)
28		-1-
		ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

Debat E. Kennedry In	
Defense Law Office of Julian Gres	sser
Franklin Lakes, NJ 07417 Santa Barbara, CA 93130	
	l.com
E: <u>rfk.assistant@childrenshealthdefense.org</u>	
McCollough Law Firm PC	
(512) 633-3498	
F: (512) 692-2522	
-2-	
ELECTION REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE RECORI)
	752 Franklin Ave., Suite 511 P.O. Box 30397 Franklin Lakes, NJ 07417 Santa Barbara, CA 93130 V: (202) 854-1310 F: (512) 692-2522 E: rfk.assistant@childrenshealthdefense.org (pending pro hac vice) W. Scott McCollough McCollough Law Firm PC McCollough Law Firm PC 2290 Gatlin Creck Rd. Dripping Springs, Texas 78620 (512) 633-3498 Y: (512) 633-3498 F: (512) 632-3522 E: wsmc@dotlaw.biz (pending pro hac vice)

1	TO THE HONORABLE COURT, RESPONDENTS AND REAL PARTIES:
2	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT under the California Environmental Quality Act, Pub. Res.
3	Code § 21167.6(b)(2), Plaintiffs and Petitioners Fiber First Los Angeles, Mothers of East LA, Union
4	Binacional de Organizaciones de Trabajadores Mexicanos Exbraceros 1942-1964, Boyle Heights
5	Community Partners, United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in California, California Fires &
6	Firefighters, Malibu for Safe Tech, EMF Safety Network, Californians for Safe Technology, 5G Free
7	California, and Children's Health Defense hereby elect to prepare the administrative record of
8	proceedings in the referenced matter.
9	DATED: March 7, 2023 MITCHELL M. TSAI, ATTORNEY AT LAW
10	mitte 1
11	By: MITCHELL M. TSAI
12	Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Petitioners
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	-3-
	ELECTION REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

EXHIBIT C

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Mitchell M. Tsai (Cal. Bar No. 277156) Armita A. Ariano (Cal Bar No. 314434) Mitchell M. Tsai, Attorney at Law 139 South Hudson Avenue, Suite 200 Pasadena, California 91101 V: (626) 314-3821, F: (626) 389-5414 E: <u>mitch@mitchtsailaw.com</u> E: <u>armita@mitchtsailaw.com</u> E: <u>info@mitchtsailaw.com</u> E: <u>info@mitchtsailaw.com</u> Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Petitioners Fiber First I Angeles <i>et al</i> (Additional counsel on following pag SUPERIOR COURT OF TI FOR THE COUNT	ge) HE	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
11 12	FIBER FIRST LOS ANGELES; MOTHERS)	CASE NO.:
12	OF EAST LA; UNION BINACIONAL DE ORGANIZACIONES DE TRABAJADORES)	REQUEST FOR HEARING
13	MEXICANOS EXBRACEROS 1942-1964; BOYLE HEIGHTS COMMUNITY)	California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub
14	PARTNERS; UNITED KEETOOWAH BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA;)	Res. Code § 21000 <i>et seq</i> ; Planning & Zoning Law, Cal. Government Code 65000 <i>et seq</i> ;
15 16	CALIFORNIA FIRES & FIREFIGHTERS;)	County Code §§ 22.02.050, 22.232.040,
16	MALIBU FOR SAFE TECH; EMF SAFETY NETWORK; CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFE)	22.244.030, and 22.244.040; Cal. Const. art. I, § 7; Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1085, 1094.5
	TECHNOLOGY; 5G FREE CALIFORNIA;)	
18	and CHILDREN'S HEALTH DEFENSE,)	Dep't:
19 20	Plaintiffs and Petitioners, v.)	
20)	
21	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES BOARD OF SUPERVISORS;)	
22	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION; COUNTY OF)	
23	LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF)	
24	REGIONAL PLANNING; COUNTY OF LOS)	
25	ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS; and DOES 1–10, inclusive;)	
26	Defendants, Respondents, and Real)	
27	Parties in Interest)	
28)	
		-1-	
	REQUEST I	FOI	RHEARING

	Dehert F. Konnedy, In	
1	Chief Litigation Counsel, Children's Health (Cal. Bar No.	50656)
2	DefenseLaw Office of752 Franklin Ave., Suite 511P.O. Box 3039	Julian Gresser
3	B Franklin Lakes, NJ 07417 Santa Barbara	, CA 93130
4	V: (202) 854-1310 V: 805-563-32 F: (512) 692-2522 E: juliangress	226 er77@gmail.com
5		
6		
7	7 McCollough Law Firm PC	
8	2290 Gatlin Creek Rd. Dripping Springs, Texas 78620	
9	(512) 633-3498	
10		
11	E: <u>wsmc@dotlaw.biz</u> (pending <i>pro hac vice</i>)	
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	REQUEST FOR HEARING	

1

TO THE HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that, pursuant to Public Resources Code§ 21167.4 and Los Angeles County Superior Court Local Rule 3.232(h), Petitioners and Plaintiffs Fiber First Los Angeles together with Mothers of East LA, Union Binacional de Organizaciones de Trabajadores Mexicanos Exbraceros 1942-1964, Boyle Heights Community Partners, United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in California, California Fires & Firefighters, Malibu for Safe Tech, EMF Safety Network, Californians for Safe Technology, 5G Free California, and Children's Health Defense (collectively "Petitioners") request a hearing on the merits of their Verified Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Petition"), which Petition alleges violations of, inter alia, the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"), Public Resources Code § 21000 et seq.

This request is being filed with the Court and served on the parties. Following the filing of this Request for Hearing and Notice of Request, any party may apply to the Court to establish a briefing schedule and hearing date for the hearing. Leavitt v. County of Madera (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1514-23. The hearing date, time, and place, and the briefing schedule for the hearing are to be established by the Court following such application by any party. Id.

DATED: March 7, 2023

MITCHELL M. TSAI, ATTORNEY AT LAW

CHELL M. TSAI Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Petitioners

EXHIBIT D

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Mitchell M. Tsai (Cal. Bar No. 277156) Naira Soghbatyan (Cal. Bar No. 309599) Reza A. Mohamadzadeh (Cal. Bar No. 332444) Mitchell M. Tsai Law Firm 139 South Hudson Avenue, Suite 200 Pasadena, California 91101 T: (626) 314-3821, F: (626) 389-5414 E: <u>mitch@mitchtsailaw.com</u> E: <u>naira@mitchtsailaw.com</u> E: <u>reza@mitchtsailaw.com</u> E: <u>info@mitchtsailaw.com</u> E: <u>info@mitchtsailaw.com</u> Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Petitioners Fiber First L Angeles <i>et al.</i> (Additional counsel on following pag SUPERIOR COURT OF TH	
11	FOR THE COUNTY	OF LOS ANGELES
12	FIBER FIRST LOS ANGELES; MOTHERS) CASE NO.: 23STCP00750
13	OF EAST LA; UNION BINACIONAL DE ORGANIZACIONES DE TRABAJADORES)) NOTICE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL
14	MEXICANOS EXBRACEROS 1942-1964;)
15	BOYLE HEIGHTS COMMUNITY PARTNERS; UNITED KEETOOWAH BAND	California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub Res. Code § 21000 <i>et seq.</i> ; Planning & Zoning
16 17	OF CHEROKEE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA; CALIFORNIA FIRES & FIREFIGHTERS; MALIBU FOR SAFE TECH; EMF SAFETY	 Law, Cal. Government Code § 65000 <i>et seq.</i>; County Code §§ 22.02.050, 22.232.040, 22.244.030, and 22.244.040; Cal. Const. art. I,
18	NETWORK; CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFE TECHNOLOGY; 5G FREE CALIFORNIA;) § 7; Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1085, 1094.5
19	and CHILDREN'S HEALTH DEFENSE,) Petition filed: March 7, 2023
20	Plaintiffs and Petitioners,) $\frac{\text{Trial:}}{\text{Date:}}$ March 12, 2023
21	V.) Time: 1:30 p.m.
22	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES BOARD OF SUPERVISORS;) Assigned for all purposes to the Honorable
23	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION; COUNTY OF	James C. Chalfant, Department 85
24	LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF)
25	REGIONAL PLANNING; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC))
26	WORKS; and DOES 1–10, inclusive;)
27	Defendants, Respondents, and Real Parties in Interest))
28)
	-	1-

1	Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. Chief Litigation Counsel, Children's Health	Julian Gresser (Cal. Bar No. 50656)
2	Defense	Law Office of Julian Gresser
3	752 Franklin Ave., Suite 511 Franklin Lakes, NJ 07417	P.O. Box 30397 Santa Barbara, CA 93130
4	P: (202) 854-1310	P: 805-563-3226
5	E: <u>rfk.assistant@childrenshealthdefense.org</u>	E: juliangresser77@gmail.com
6	(pending <i>pro hac vice</i>)	
7	W. Scott McCollough McCollough Law Firm PC	
8	2290 Gatlin Creek Rd.	
9	Dripping Springs, Texas 78620 (512) 633-3498	
10	P: (512) 633-3498 F: (512) 692-2522	
11	E: <u>wsmc@dotlaw.biz</u>	
12	(pending <i>pro hac vice</i>)	
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	-2- NOTICE TO ATTO	

1	To the Attorney General of the State of California:
2	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, under Public Resources Code § 21167.7 and Code of Civil
3	Procedure § 388, that on November 2, 2023, Plaintiffs and Petitioners filed a FIRST AMENDED
4	VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
5	AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF against COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, and DOES 1-10 (collectively,
6	"Defendants, Respondents, and Real Parties in Interest") in the Los Angeles County Superior Court.
7	The Plaintiffs and Petitioners allege, inter alia, violations of the California Environmental Quality Act
8	("CEQA"), Public Resources Code § 21100, et seq, Planning & Zoning Law, Cal. Government Code
9	65000 et seq; County Code §§ 22.02.050, 22.232.040, 22.244.030, and 22.244.040; Cal. Const. art. I,
10	§ 7; Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1085, 1094.5
11	A copy of the First Amended Petition is attached as Exhibit A.
12	DATED: November 2, 2023 MITCHELL M. TSAI LAW FIRM
13	mitte 1
14	By:
15	NAIRA SOGHBATYAN
16	REZA S. MOHAMADZADEH
17 18	Attorneys for Petitioners and Plaintiffs FIBER FIRST LOS ANGELES, <i>et al.</i>
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	-3-
	NOTICE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

1	PROOF OF SERVICE
2	I, Steven Thong declare that:
3	I am a citizen of the United States and work in Los Angeles County, California. I am over the
4	age of eighteen years and am not a party to the within entitled action. My business address is: 139 S.
5	Hudson Ave., Suite 200, Pasadena, California 91101. I served this list of persons with the following document(s) on November 2, 2023:
6	NOTICE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL
7	The document(s) was served on:
8	CEQA Coordinator
9	Office of the Attorney General
10	Environment Section 1300 "I" Street
11	Sacramento, CA 95814-2919
12	Em: <u>CEQA@doj.ca.gov</u>
13	\underline{X} by electronic service, via either electronic transmission or notification consistent with California Code of Civil Procedure 1010.6.
14	
15	I declare under penalty of perjury, according to the laws of the State of California, that the
16	foregoing is true and correct.
17	Executed this November 2nd, 2023, at Pasadena, California.
18	Ana Alt
19	Steven Thong
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	-4-
	NOTICE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

1	PROOF OF SERVICE
2	I, Steven Thong declare that:
3	I am a citizen of the United States and work in Los Angeles County, California. I am over the
4	age of eighteen years and am not a party to the within entitled action. My business address is: 139 South Hudson Avenue, Suite 200, Pasadena, California 91101. I served this list of persons with the
5 6	following document(s) on November 2, 2023:
7	FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND COMPLAINT
8	FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
9	The document(s) was served on:
10	Roland Trinh Gail Karish
11	Office of the County CounselAlisha Winterswyk500 West Temple Street #648Ali V. Tehrani
12	Los Angeles, CA 90012Patricia UrseaEm: rtrinh@counsel.lacounty.gov Best Best & Krieger LLP
13	18101 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 1000
14	Irvine, CA 92612 Em: <u>gail.karish@bbklaw.com</u>
15	Em: <u>alisha.winterswyk@bbklaw.com</u> Em: <u>ali.tehrani@bbklaw.com</u>
16	Em: patricia.ursea@bbklaw.com
17	
18	
19	\underline{X} by electronic service, via either electronic transmission or notification consistent with
20	California Code of Civil Procedure 1010.6.
21	I declare under penalty of perjury, according to the laws of the State of California, that the
22	foregoing is true and correct. Executed this November 2nd, 2023, at Pasadena, California.
23	Atma the
24	Steven Thong
25	
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	-1- PROOF OF SERVICE